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Corruption is a significant problem around the world.  Large-scale public works projects 
are especially prone to corruption.  Much international effort has been devoted to fighting 
corruption, but the impact of these efforts is debatable. 
 
Public-sector procurement in the Canadian province of Quebec has, since 2009, been 
beset by scandal.  After defeat of the Liberal government in 2012, the first bill introduced 
by the new Parti Québécois government was an anti-corruption measure.  The heart of 
Bill 1 is a system by which construction contractors have to demonstrate “integrity” in 
order to bid on public contracts. 
 
Quebec’s lawmakers could have looked to international and national anti-corruption 
instruments, a vast literature, and practical examples from other jurisdictions.  Instead, 
there is almost no reference in the debates to this anti-corruption context.  The lawmaking 
process was driven by other imperatives, particularly speed.  The author draws 
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The first bill introduced in Quebec’s National Assembly following the September 4, 
2012, election victory of the Parti Québécois under leader Pauline Marois was the 
anti-corruption Integrity in Public Contracts Act.1  Throughout this thesis, this bill 
will be referred to as Bill 1.2  
 
Public-sector corruption, and specifically corruption in public-sector procurement, 
had risen to the top of Quebec’s political agenda in the three years preceding the 
introduction of Bill 1.  Beginning with two reports from the Radio-Canada 
investigative show Enquête in September and October of 2009, a system of 
collusionand bid-rigging in the construction industry was exposed.3   The widening 
                                                 
1
 SQ 2012, c 25. The title in French is Loi sur l’intégrité en matière de contrats public. A 
note on translation: The official language of Quebec is French, and the working language 
of the Quebec National Assembly is French.  The National Assembly also produces an 
official English version of its statutes.  Where there is an official English version of a 
document or title, the English title will be used.  Where there is no official English 
version, the French version will be used, with the author’s translation in square brackets.  
Subsequent uses of a document or title are to the English translation. 
2
 In Quebec, as in other provinces, the numbering of bills begins afresh with every new 
session of the legislature.  For example, the first bill introduced in every session is Bill 1.  
Over time, therefore, it becomes confusing to refer to a bill by its number, because there 
are so many.  Nevertheless, there are two reasons why bill numbers are useful, and why 
the shorthand “Bill 1” is used throughout this thesis.  First is the sheer convenience of 
using the bill number as a short title.  Quebec does not follow the “short title” convention 
used in English-language legislatures, so the official bill names tend to be long.  Second, 
a bill that attracts considerable public attention is known, ever after, by that bill number.  
The public often does not know, or care, what the official title of the bill is, nor the 
correct citation, nor the fact that there are many other bills with the same number. 
3
 The broadcasts were “Un club select, selon un entrepreneur” [translation: “A select 
club, according to one businessman”], aired on September 21, 2009, available online at 
<http://ici.radio-canada.ca/regions/Montreal/2009/09/20/004-construction-exclusif-
enquete.shtml> and “Collusion frontale: pratiques douteuses dans l’industrie de la 




scandal grew to cover Quebec’s largest engineering firms, construction companies, 
construction trade unions, organized crime, and provincial and municipal 
politicians.   
 
The Liberal government under Premier Jean Charest tried to deal with the ever-
growing scandal with a series of legislative measures, setting up a co-ordinated anti-
corruption unit, and eventually, appointing a public inquiry: the Commission 
d’enquête sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la 
construction.4   The Commission is commonly referred to as the Charbonneau 
Commission after its chair, Justice France Charbonneau of the Quebec Superior 
Court.  The Commission was set up by Order in Council on October 19, 2011,5 and 
commenced its hearings on May 22, 2012.6  The revelations at the hearings 
transfixed Quebecers, who were able to watch proceedings on the commission’s 
dedicated television channel. 
 
The opposition Parti Québécois (PQ) sensed a political opportunity and, in the 
period leading up to the provincial election on September 4, 2012, made Liberal 
corruption a key issue.  The PQ won the most seats in the election, but fell short of a 
majority.  The minority PQ government led by Marois was sworn in a couple of 
weeks later.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
industry”, aired on October 15, 2009], available online at <http://ici.radio-
canada.ca/emissions/enquete/2009-2010/Reportage.asp?idDoc=93395>. 
4
 [translation: Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Public 
Contracts in the Construction Industry].  In French media, the acronym “CEIC” is 
commonly used, as well as “la Commission Charbonneau.”  In English media, the 
reference is almost always to “the Charbonneau Commission”. 
5
 D 1029-2011, GOQ 2011.II.4767. 
6
 The Charbonneau Commission has a website with extensive information about its 





The provincial legislature, known as the Assemblée Nationale,7 was called into 
session on October 30, 2012.8  Bill 1 was introduced the next day.9  Given the 
prominence of the corruption issue in the election, it is not surprising that the PQ 
government should, in its legislative program, give priority to integrity in public-
sector procurement.  There was political advantage in painting an immediate, sharp 
contrast with the defeated Liberal government. 
 
The minister responsible for Bill 1 was Stéphane Bédard, minister for the Treasury 
Board.   Bédard, a 44-year-old lawyer, was a veteran member of the National 
Assembly (MNA).  He was first elected MNA for Chicoutimi in 1998, when he was 
only thirty years old, and had served continuously ever since.  His father, Marc-
André Bédard, had been a PQ stalwart and had served as a minister in the 
government of Premier Réné Lévesque in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
Over the course of the parliamentary hearings on Bill 1, Bédard recounted the 
genesis of the bill.  On his first day in office as minister, he sat down with a senior 
civil servant at the Treasury Board, Julie Blackburn, to sketch a plan.10  A team was 
put together to research and draft a bill.  Bédard recounts that this team worked 
night and day for a month and a half until the bill was ready.11 
 
The “heart”12 of Bill 1 is a new administrative procedure, in which companies 
wishing to bid on public contracts must obtain, from the Autorité des marchés 
                                                 
7
 [Translation: National Assembly.] 
8
 There is extensive online information about the National Assembly at 
<www.assnat.qc.ca>, including full transcripts of both the National Assembly itself and 
of its committees.  The online transcripts do not, unfortunately, contain page numbers. 
9
 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg, 1st Sess (1 November 2012). 
10
 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats de la Commission des finances 
publiques (27 November 2012). 
11
 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats de la Commission des finances 
publiques, 40th Leg, 1st Sess (12 November 2012) (Stéphane Bédard). 
12
 This expression (“the heart of the bill”) is used frequently by Minister Bédard 
throughout the legislative hearings : Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats 




financiers (AMF)13 a certificate of integrity.  Without the certificate, the company 
cannot bid.  The AMF’s decision whether to grant the certificate is to be based on a 
mixture of objective and subjective factors.14 
 
Over the next thirty-six days, Bill 1 passed through all stages of the approval 
process, and received Royal Assent on December 7, 2012.  Most of it entered into 
force on that day. 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND ISSUES 
 
1.2.1 The Research Question and Why It Matters 
 
This thesis is a case study on the making of statute law, and specifically on 
lawmakers’ reasoning as they consider how to confront a pressing public-policy 
issue; in this case, corruption in public-sector procurement. 
 
The principal research question in this thesis is: What did Quebec’s lawmakers think 
they were doing when they were debating Bill 1?  To put it another way: Did 
Quebec’s lawmakers believe Bill 1 would have an impact on corruption in public-
sector procurement, and if so, what was the basis for that belief? 
 
An immediate objection comes to mind: Why does it matter what Quebec’s 
lawmakers were thinking?  In Canada, there is a well-established legal principle that 
                                                                                                                                                 
November 2012).  The same expression is used by Julie Blackburn, Treasury Board 
Secretariat, on December 3, 2012. 
13
 [Translation: Financial Markets Authority.]  This body would be known in most other 
provinces as the Securities Commission. 
14




transcripts of proceedings in an elected assembly15 are of limited value in the 
interpretation of statutes.  The general rule has been laid down in two Supreme 
Court of Canada decisions: R. v. Morgentaler16 in 1993, and Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes17 
in 1998.  The rule is that Hansard is admissible, but should not be given much 
weight. 
 
In Morgentaler, Sopinka J. traces the early rejection of Hansard evidence, and the 
more recent relaxation of that rule: 
 
The former exclusionary rule regarding evidence of legislative history 
has gradually been relaxed (Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights 
Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, at pp. 317-19), but until recently the 
courts have balked at admitting evidence of legislative debates and 
speeches.  Such evidence was described by Dickson J. in Reference re 
Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, supra, at p. 721 as "inadmissible as 
having little evidential weight", and was excluded in Reference re Upper 
Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, supra, at p. 319, and Attorney 
General of Canada v. Reader's Digest Association (Canada) Ltd., [1961] 
S.C.R. 775.  The main criticism of such evidence has been that it cannot 
represent the "intent" of the legislature, an incorporeal body, but that is 
equally true of other forms of legislative history.  Provided that the court 
remains mindful of the limited reliability and weight of Hansard 
evidence, it should be admitted as relevant to both the background and 
the purpose of legislation.
18
 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
The last, underlined sentence is the one most commonly cited with respect to 
Hansard evidence. 
 
                                                 
15
 Parliamentary transcripts are known in English-speaking provinces as “Hansard”, after 
an early printer and publisher of parliamentary transcripts at Westminster.  That name 
will be used throughout this thesis, even though it is not commonly used in Quebec. 
16
 [1993] 3 SCR 463, 1993 CanLII 74 (SCC), hereafter Morgentaler. 
17
 [1998] 1 SCR 27, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), hereafter Rizzo Shoes. 
18




In Rizzo Shoes, Iacobucci J. extends the principle of Morgentaler so as to apply to all 
cases of statutory interpretation, and not just constitutional “pith and substance” 
cases: 
 
Although the frailties of Hansard evidence are many, this Court has 





Notably, Iacobucci J. does not enumerate “the many frailties” of Hansard.  The main 
difficulty, referred to by Sopinka J. in Morgentaler, is that in a multi-member body 
like a legislature, there is no single person who can speak about what “the 
legislature” intended.  This conceptual difficulty is at the root of Canadian courts’ 
reluctance to accept Hansard evidence as proof of its contents. 
 
In the end, the Morgentaler/Rizzo rule is clear enough: Hansard is admissible, but 
with limited weight.  In Rizzo Shoes itself, Iacobucci J. demonstrated a restrained use 
of Hansard: a brief quotation from the sponsoring minister’s second-reading speech, 
supporting an interpretation reached by other means.20   
 
Based solely on the Morgentaler/Rizzo rule, then, it may well be argued that a deep 
examination of Hansard is misplaced.  But the purpose of the legal scholarly 
examination of Hansard, as proposed in this thesis, is different from the purpose of 
judicial examination.  When a court is considering statute law, it is engaged in an 
interpretive exercise.  It is trying to determine how a law stated in general terms 
should be applied to a set of facts.  As part of this exercise, it will consider, among 
other things, the background to the law (sometimes expressed as “the mischief to be 
remedied”) and the lawmakers’ intention.21 
 
                                                 
19
 Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 SCR 27 at 46. 
20
 Ibid at 45-46. 
21
 The various Interpretation Acts across Canada all state some version of this 
requirement, e.g. Interpretation Act, RSQ c I-16, s 41; Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-




The purpose of the methodology adopted in this thesis is not to aid in statutory 
interpretation, in the narrow sense in which that inquiry is conducted in the courts.  
The purpose is to put the law-making process under the microscope to determine 
how legislation is made.   
 
Ultimately, the purpose of the methodology adopted in this thesis is to improve the 
quality of legislation.   This thesis fits within the broad framework of law reform and 
public interest advocacy.  The more we understand about how laws are made, the 
more likely it is that future lawmakers will understand how to make laws that 
actually achieve their ostensible objectives, and the more likely it is that engaged 
citizens will be able to influence future lawmakers to adopt effective laws. 
 
There is another, more unique aspect to this thesis: I am myself a former lawmaker.  
I served for twelve years in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly.  This personal 
experience influences my choice of topic, informs my analysis, and helps me to 
understand the dynamics in the Quebec National Assembly and its committees.   
 
Outside the constitutional context, legal practitioners and scholars in Canada do not 
typically devote themselves to detailed study of how a particular law was made.  
There is a well-known gap between scholarly literature and what actually gets done 
in the legislature.22  Scholars seem nonplussed by this gap, and uncertain what to do 
about it.  
 
My personal experience is that judges, lawyers, law students, and legal academics 
are not, on the whole, very knowledgeable about the law-making process.  If they 
are knowledgeable, it is about the formalities: second reading follows first reading, 
referral to committee follows second reading, and so on.  (There are exceptions, of 
                                                 
22
  See, for example, Michelle M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, “Empirical Health Law 
Scholarship: The State of the Field” (2008) 96 Geo LJ 649, Section III (Impact) and 
Section IV (Future Directions), where the authors trace the impact, or lack of impact, of 




course, especially those who have served in a legislature or at senior levels of the 
civil service.)  There is relatively little understanding of the law-making process as a 
complex machine in motion.  Lawmakers have their own psychology, and 
legislatures have their own sociology, but for most people they are a mystery. 
 
“Nobody should watch a law or a sausage being made” is an aphorism frequently 
attributed to 19th-century German chancellor Otto van Bismarck.  There is no 
evidence that he actually said it, but it’s a good line: the legislative process can be 
messy and unappetizing.  The legal profession takes this Bismarckian aphorism too 
far, and generally averts its eyes from the law-making process.  My research project 
is to take a long, hard, systematic look at one particular sausage produced by one 
particular sausage factory: Bill 1, the Integrity in Public Contracts Act, debated by the 
Quebec National Assembly in the late fall of 2012, and passed into law on December 
7, 2012. 
 
1.2.2 Sources and data 
 
The circumstances of Bill 1’s passage through the National Assembly are amenable to 
careful study, because there are verbatim transcripts of all proceedings.   
 
After introduction on November 1, 2012, Bill 1 was referred to the Commission des 
finances publics,
23
 which is a standing committee of the National Assembly.  The 
Standing Committee held extensive hearings (four days, during which it heard eighteen 
formal presentations)  and deliberations (eight days) for which there are also verbatim 
transcripts (totalling 171,425 and 216,607 words, respectively).  Those transcripts, which 
are all available on-line,
24
 provide the principal factual foundation for this thesis.  
Reliance on the transcripts has the methodological advantage that the transcripts are 
                                                 
23
 [Translation: Standing Committee on Public Finance.]  Hereafter, this committee will 
be referred to as “the Standing Committee”. 
24




equally available to all researchers.  Future studies of Bill 1 can proceed on the same 
factual basis as this study. 
 
Apart from the simple fact that they are available, the Bill 1 transcripts are an unusually 
rich source of information.  Because the Marois government could not command majority 
support from within the ranks of its own caucus, the government had to win opposition 
support not only for the bill itself, but for every amendment it proposed, and also to 
defeat any amendment it opposed.  As Minister Bédard put it, during his second-reading 
speech: 
 
Donc, je reste ouvert aux commentaires. Nous sommes en situation, vous 
le savez, de... en situation minoritaire, ce qui nous impose à chacun, et 
pas seulement à moi, l'obligation d'agir avec souplesse, à l'écoute. On 





[translation: So I’m open to comments. We’re in the situation, you know, 
of… in a minority situation, which imposes on each of us, and not just on 
me, an obligation to act with flexibility, to listen.  Everyone can have 
ideas.  It’s not just because one has an idea that it’s the best.] 
 
The fact that Bill 1 was debated during a minority government means that the 
government’s thought process is unusually transparent. 
 
There are, however, methodological challenges with reliance on transcripts.  First, there 
is the question of accuracy.  Hansard is produced by after-the-fact transcription of audio 
recordings.
26
  There is no guarantee that the written transcript is error-free.
27
  On the 
                                                 
25
 Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 40th Leg, 1st Sess (20 November 
2012) (Stéphane Bédard). 
26
 In some assemblies, there are also video recordings.  Video recordings of committee 
hearings are less common.  Whether or not there are video recordings, Hansard is 
generally produced from the audio recording. 
27
 In the Nova Scotia assembly, there is no formal mechanism for correcting errors in the 
transcript.  In the House of Commons, a draft (“the blues”) is circulated to members, who 
may request corrections, including (with restrictions) what they meant to say, rather than 





other hand, there is no better source of information on what was said during the 
legislative process.  Another aspect of accuracy is the fact that something is lost, 
inevitably, in the reduction of oral speech to writing.  One loses emotion, pace, tone, and 
similar features of the spoken word.  The transcriber must also attempt to punctuate the 
utterances, and it may not be in keeping with how the speaker sounded or what the 
speaker intended. 
 
Secondly, there is the question of context.  The recordings, and therefore the transcript, 
capture mainly the voice of the person who “has the floor,” and so misses what is going 
on elsewhere in the room.  The reality of legislative proceedings is that there are many 
people in the room, and much can be going on: asides, interjections, distractions, 
interruptions.  It is, for example, sometimes apparent from the transcript that the speaker 
is responding to something that someone else has said, but the recording has failed to 
pick up that interjection.  The researcher cannot be sure what the interjection was, or who 
said it, and must guess from the context of the speaker’s response.  In short: transcripts of 
legislative proceedings are a rich source of information, but they must be used with due 
recognition of their limitations. 
 
Another methodological route, either instead of or in addition to an examination of the 
transcripts, would have been to conduct interviews with the principal actors: for example, 
interviews with the minister who sponsored the bill, and led it through committee; with 
the chief spokespersons for the opposition parties; with the other members of the standing 
committee; and with the lead civil servants.  I have chosen not to pursue that route for 
several reasons: the logistical reasons associated with travel to another province; the 
obtaining of ethics approvals; the uncertainty of whether the proposed interviewees 
would in fact agree to an interview; and the quality and reliability of the evidence so 
obtained.  The last reason is, in my view, the most significant. 
 
A researcher must, to be blunt, be concerned about the reliability of politicians’ 
recollections.  First, there is simply the question of memory.  With the passage of time, 




complete, contemporaneous record of what was said.   Second, there is a question of a 
politician’s later account being changed to suit a narrative motivated by reasons other 
than strict factual accuracy.   My experience is that politicians are prone to 
“remembering” what they wish had happened, rather than what did happen.  Ex-
politicians can be more reliable, because they are less worried about negative 
repercussions from being truthful,
28
 but that is not invariably true. 
 
With respect to Bill 1, the principal dramatis personae are, with only one exception, still 
actively engaged in politics at the time that this thesis is being submitted (spring 2015).  
The principal actors in the development and debate of Bill 1 were: 
 
 Stéphane Bédard.  MNA for Chicoutimi since 1998. In the 2012 PQ 
administration, he was minister responsible for government administration, Chair 
of the Treasury Board, and Government House Leader. He was Bill 1’s 
sponsoring minister, and therefore the chief spokesperson for the government on 
Bill 1.   
 Sam Hamad.  Liberal MNA for Louis-Hébert since 2003. Former minister in the 
Charest government.  Opposition critic for Treasury Board, and chief 
spokesperson for the opposition Liberal party on Bill 1.  First speaker for the 
Liberals on Bill 1 on November 20, 2012.   
 Jacques Duchesneau.  MNA for Saint-Jérôme, 2012-2014, with the Coalition 
Avenir Québec (CAQ).  Police chief of Montreal, 1994-98. Chief spokesperson 
for CAQ on Bill 1. 
 Amir Khadir.  Co-leader of the small opposition party Quebec Solidaire.  
Participated occasionally in the standing committee hearings on Bill 1. 
 Julie Blackburn.  Secrétaire associée aux marchés publics, Secrétariat du Conseil 
du trésor [translation: Associate Secretary for Public Markets, Treasury Board 
                                                 
28
 Alison Loat and Michael Macmillan, Tragedy in the Commons: Former Members of 
Parliament Speak Out About Canada’s Failing Democracy (Toronto: Random House 
Canada, 2014) is a good example of the value of interviewing politicians after they have 
left politics.  For reasons stated in the book, very few of the eighty ex-MPs interviewed 




Secretariat].  Key civil servant in the Treasury Board Secretariat.  Project lead on 
the drafting of Bill 1.  Permitted to speak at meetings of the Standing Committee 
on Public Finances.   
 
MNAs Bédard, Hamad, and Khadir were re-elected in the 2014 Quebec provincial 
election, and continue to sit as members of the National Assembly.  Of the principal 
actors on Bill 1, only MNA Duchesneau is today out of politics.  He did not re-offer in 





This thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the concept of “corruption”, and 
the national and international instruments that have grown to fight it.  Chapter 3 reviews 
the academic literature on corruption.  Both Chapters 2 and 3 focus on corruption in 
public-sector procurement, because the anti-corruption fight and its literature are vast, 
and growing by the week.  Chapters 2 and 3 are also generally limited to what was 
published by the end of 2012, because that was “the state of the art” when Bill 1 was 
being developed and debated in the Quebec National Assembly.  Chapter 4 is the heart of 
the thesis.  It consists of a close analysis of Bill 1 and its passage through the Quebec 
National Assembly.  Chapter 5 draws some conclusions about what was going on in the 










CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTS AND INSTRUMENTS 
 
2.1 CONCEPTS: CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
2.1.1 Corruption as a contested concept 
 
Bill 1 was a response to a series of stories of corrupt practices in recent years, but nobody 
would suggest that corruption is a new phenomenon. Corruption is referred to in the Old 
Testament
29
 and appears throughout recorded history.
30
  Corruption has existed 
throughout recorded history and across political systems.
31
  There is a vast academic and 
non-academic literature on public-sector corruption.  Kleinig and Heffernan, writing in 
2004, refer to “a massive quantity of discussion and research.”
32
  Yet despite the volume 
of writing on corruption, there is not universal agreement on what “corruption” is.  That 
massive quantity of discussion and research, say Kleinig and Heffernan, has “yielded few 
shared understandings.”
33
   
 
If there is agreement on corruption, it is that corruption is a complex phenomenon:  
 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon with economic, social, political 





In the same vein, Tabish and Jha, writing in 2011, say 
                                                 
29
 Exodus 23:8: “And thou shalt take no bribe: for a bribe blindeth them that have sight, 
and perverteth the words of the righteous” (American Standard Version).  Other 
references to bribery in the Old Testament include Deuteronomy 16:19 and 27:15, 
Proverbs 17:8, Ecclesiastes 7:7, Isaiah 5:23, and Amos 5:12. 
30
 John T. Noonan Jr., Bribes (1984: New York: Macmillan), an erudite study of bribery, 
with illustrations from throughout recorded history. 
31
 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: 
Academic Press, 1978) at 2, note 2. 
32
 John Kleinig and William C. Heffernan, “The Corruptibility of Corruption,” in Private 




 EU, Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 





Fighting corruption is very difficult because it is a multi-faceted social 





Even a very experienced anti-corruption crusader like Laurence Cockcroft, one of the co-
founders of a leading anti-corruption NGO, Transparency International (TI),
36
 does not 
attempt to define “corruption” in his recent book on corruption and the genesis of TI: 
 
Formal definitions of corruption range from the decay of society to the 
single act of bribery.  The corruption discussed in this book always 
involves the acquisition of money, assets or power in a way which 
escapes the public view; is usually illegal; and is at the expense of 
society as a whole either at a ‘grand’ or everyday level.  Personal 
enrichment is nearly always a key objective, although corruption may be 
engineered by a group with the intention of achieving or retaining 




We see, in this quotation, that the definitional conundrum is simply avoided.  Cockcroft 
settles instead for a description of certain features of what he will write about.  This 
strategy is common throughout the literature: description and anecdote rather than 
definition. 
 
Of the many conceptual difficulties involved in defining corruption, one of the knottiest 
is the question of cultural relativism.  This idea is frequently expressed in some variation 
on the thought that an action considered corrupt in one society may not be considered 
corrupt in another society.  In an era seeing substantial growth in international anti-
corruption instruments and organizations, it is an important question whether anti-
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corruption efforts are an attempt to impose upon developing countries moral values of 




How, then, to reconcile the vast literature on corruption with the fact that, when pressed, 
the concept becomes squishy, and can be elaborated only with the use of anecdotes and 
examples?  It may be a matter of, as Justice Potter Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court 




Always keeping in mind the vastness of the literature, and the paucity of shared 
understandings, the most widely-used definition of corruption is “the use of public office 
for personal gain,”
40
 which can also be expressed as “the abuse of entrusted power for 
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 Åse Berit Grødeland & Aadne Aasland, “Fighting corruption in public procurement in 
post-communist states: Obstacles and solutions” (2011) 44 Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 17.  Corruption is high in post-communist states, and is especially 
high in public procurement.  Moreover, the corruption has been stubbornly resistant to 
anti-corruption measures.  The authors posit that anti-corruption measures imported from 
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39
 He was, in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), writing about hard-core pornography.  Here’s the 
full text of Justice Potter’s concurrence in Jacobellis, with the footnotes omitted: 
 
It is possible to read the Court's opinion in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. 
California, 354 U.S. 476, in a variety of ways. In saying this, I imply no criticism 
of the Court, which, in those cases, was faced with the task of trying to define 
what may be indefinable. I have reached the conclusion, which I think is 
confirmed at least by negative implication in the Court's decisions since Roth and 
Alberts, that, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, criminal laws in this 
area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography.  I shall not today 
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within 
that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing 
so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not 
that. 
40
 C.W. Gray and D. Kaufmann, “Corruption and Development”, in 35 Finance and 
Development 1 at 7, cited by S.Z.S. Tabish and Kumar Heeraj Jha (2012), “The impact of 
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  This definition is good enough for conversation, or for popular literature.  
But when it comes time to translate the concept into legal terms—a rule that can be 
promulgated, understood by those to whom it applies, and fairly enforced against them—
it tends to fall apart.  That is because “corruption” is at bottom a philosophical concept 
and not a legal one. 
 
In this respect, corruption takes its place among other concepts like “the public interest,” 
of which there are thousands of instances in Canadian statute law.  As Michael Feintuck 
writes, “Though the very phrase ‘the public interest’ has an air of democratic propriety, 
the absence of any identifiable normative content renders the concept insubstantial, and 
hopelessly vulnerable to annexation or colonization by those who exercise power in 
society.”
42
  Feintuck goes on to suggest, as an explanation for its persistence, “… the 
term is so commonly used, and so historically persistent, that we use it without thinking 
about what it means.”
43
  The same can justifiably be said about corruption. 
 
The conceptual difficulties lead to odd results.  The United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, for example, does not include any definition of what “corruption” actually is, 
though signatory states solemnly vow to fight it.
44
  Quebec has an Anti-Corruption Act, 
but nowhere in that Act is there a definition of “corruption.”
45
  So the law is “anti” what, 
exactly?  The Act’s focus is on “a wrongdoing” (« acte répréhensible »), which is defined 
with a long list of criminal and administrative offences.
46
 Perhaps “corruption” is nothing 
more than a handy catch-all for a list of illegal behaviours. 
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If corruption is a contested concept—or simply a vague one—it goes without saying that 
any concept that incorporates corruption, such as “fighting corruption” and “anti-
corruption”, are also contested or vague.  The same is true of any concept that is at 
bottom an antonym or synonym for corruption.  For example, Bill 1 in Quebec, the 
subject of this thesis, takes “integrity” as its focal point in the fight against corruption, but 
nowhere defines what “integrity” is.  At best, there is the negative implication that if one 
receives the certificate of the Autorité des marchés financiers, and therefore is permitted 
to bid on public contracts, one must have integrity.   
 
But “integrity” is itself a subjective and contested concept.  It is not a term of art.  It is not 
judicially defined.  One author puts it this way: 
 
As philosophers also note, integrity is not only one of the most important 
and oft-cited ethical concepts, it is one of the most ambiguous. In 
common usage, “integrity” often functions as an all-purpose term of 
moral approval.  In philosophical discussions, the concept connotes a 
more specific set of qualities that make for an integrated self.  At a 
minimum, integrity demands practices that are consistent with principles, 
even in the face of strong countervailing pressures.  Yet the term also 
implies something more than steadfastness.  Fanatics may be loyal to 
their values, but we do not praise them for integrity.  What earns our 
respect is a willingness to adhere to principles that satisfy certain basic 
demands, such as reasoned deliberation, internal consistency, 




As Woolley and Stacey have pointed out in the context of professional regulation, 
practitioners in the field of psychology no longer subscribe to the idea that there is a 
quality known as “integrity” (or “good character”), that it can judged in advance, and that 
an administrative proceeding is the right forum to identify it.
48
  Nevertheless, the idea 
persists in law. 
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In the end, the word “corruption” is used, and used liberally, when precision is not 
required.  When precision is required, as in the case of enforceable rules of law, the word 
will simply not do.  As Kleinig and Heffernan put it, “Even though we may seek to 
provide corruption with a legal incarnation, it is not itself a legal notion.”
49
  They add that 
“bribery, and possibly extortion, comes closer to fitting that profile [of a legal 
concept].”
50
  That may well explain why, in legislation, the word “corruption” tends to be 
avoided, or broken down into smaller units. 
 
2.1.2 Public-Sector Procurement and Corruption 
 
This thesis zeroes in on a piece of legislation designed to counter one particular form of 
corruption—corruption in public-sector procurement—because that is the variety of 
corruption that prompted the Quebec government to respond with Bill 1.  The concept of 
corruption becomes more concrete when applied to a specific sector like public-sector 
procurement.   
 
For purposes of this thesis, “public-sector procurement” refers to contracts by public 
authorities for the acquisition of goods and services that the government needs to carry 
out its functions.
51
  The concept of public-sector procurement can apply to every contract, 
from the the acquisition of paper clips to the building of a major bridge, and so too can 
the corruption of public-sector procurement.   
 
Most of the attention in the literature, though, is on the building of very large 
infrastructure projects such as roads, airports, bridges, and similar civil infrastructure.  It 
is widely acknowledged that public infrastructure is “particularly sensitive to corruption” 
because of the large amount of money involved, and the technical complexity of large 
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   As one expert witness told the Charbonneau Commission, “The problems of 
the vulnerability of the construction industry have created a systemic vulnerability that is 




Public procurement is a distinct management discipline, with its own body of knowledge 
and practitioners.
54
  It also has its own body of literature.
55
  In that literature, corruption is 
only one relatively small strand.  
 
The essence of good public procurement is value for money.  Overlaid on this basic 
concept are values like efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness.
56
  Was the infrastructure 
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 Charbonneau Commission, Transcript, Volume 244 (October 7, 2014) at 131, lines 1-4 
(evidence of Thomas D. Thacher).  Thacher served as the first executive director of the 
Construction Industry Strike Force formed by New York State Governor Mario Cuomo in 
the 1980s, and as the New York City School Construction Authority’s first vice-president 
and inspector general from 1990 to 1996. 
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itself as “the leading voice for professionals involved in public procurement in Canada” 
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 A leading international academic on public procurement is Sue Arrowsmith of the 
University of Nottingham.  Her publications include Public Procurement: Global 
Revolution, note 51 above; and Susan L. Arrowsmith, John Linarelli, Don Wallace Jr,, 
Regulating Public Procurement (The Hague: Kluwer International Law, 2000).  The 
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being debated in the Quebec National Assembly, and thus conveniently represents “the 




built?  Was it built to a satisfactory standard and within a reasonable time?  Was the 
standard achieved at the lowest possible price?  Did all potential bidders get a fair 
opportunity to bid? 
 
It follows that “corruption” of public-sector procurement can be understood as any action 
that intentionally interferes with the efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness of the 
procurement process.  We are not focused here on good management practices, which 
would be an entirely different study.  We are focused on deliberate attempts to subvert 
well-understood and well-accepted principles of public procurement. 
 
Corruption is difficult to identify in any event, but particularly so in large-scale 
procurement: 
 
Corruption is difficult to identify since it occurs, in most cases, 
clandestinely and away from the public eye and records. It is very 
difficult to prevent or uncover these practices, for anyone who does not 
have the appropriate skills, access to the relevant documents and people 




The corruption can take many forms, and can occur at any stage of the project process, 
including “project identification, planning, financing, design, tender, execution, operation 
and maintenance.”
58
  It is the very complexity of large-scale procurement that leads to the 
opportunity to engage in, and hide, corrupt practices. 
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2.2 INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTRUMENTS 
By the time Bill 1 was introduced in the Quebec National Assembly, it took its place in 
the context of several decades’ worth of international anti-corruption instruments.  In an 
evidence-based law-making process, we should expect that Quebec’s lawmakers would 
take this international context into account.  This section reviews the major international 
instruments that existed when Bill 1 was being formulated and debated. 
 
2.2.1  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was enacted by the US Congress in 1977,
59
 
and amended in 1998 following the US government’s ratification of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention.
60
   
 
The FCPA was the first major anti-corruption instrument in any developed country, and 
is arguably, still, the most impactful.  Its enforcement is vigorous and penalties have been 
large.
61
  The FCPA extends beyond domestic issues to any “concern” with a connection 
to the United States, and indeed to any legal individual.  The definition of “foreign 
official” is expansive.
62
  Interestingly, the FCPA provisions are linked to the obligations 
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of securities issuers, including the obligation to maintain accurate financial records.  
Books are not accurate if bribes and other corrupt payments are not recorded in them. 
 
The FCPA has arguably spawned all subsequent international anti-corruption efforts.  
Once the FCPA was in force, corporations operating from the United States were under 
tighter constraints than corporations anywhere else in the world.  US-based corporations 
chafed under what they considered to be this competitive disadvantage, and so attempted 
to have similarly stringent legislation apply to corporations operating from other 
countries.  There is now an extensive FCPA-compliance industry with a burgeoning 
literature
63




2.2.2 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
 
2.2.2.1  Ratification 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(hereafter “the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”) was signed on December 17, 1997, and 
came into force on February 15, 1999.
65
 It was the first major multilateral anti-corruption 
instrument. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the defendant disputed whether an official of Colombia’s state-controlled oil company 
was a “foreign official” within the meaning of the FCPA. 
63
 The US Department of Justice (criminal division) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (enforcement division) published a “Resource Guide” to the FCPA in 
November 2012, which coincidentally was the same time that Bill 1 was wending its way 
through the Quebec National Assembly.  This commentary is itself the subject of 
commentary in Mark Pieth, Lucinda Low, and Peter Cullen (eds.), The OECD 
Convention on Bribery: A Commentary (2
nd
 ed.; Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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 For example, “The FCPA Blog”, which bills itself as “the world’s largest anti-
corruption compliance portal”: <www.fcpablog.com>.   
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Canada, a member of the OECD, deposited its instrument of ratification on December 17, 
1998, and the Convention entered into force in Canada on February 15, 1999.
66
  As a 
linked measure, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) received Royal 
Assent on December 10, 1998, and entered into force on February 14, 1999.  The CFPOA 
was, in essence, Canada’s legislative response to its obligations under the OECD 




2.2.2.2  Text of the Convention 
 
The key provisions of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention are in Article 1, which amount 
to a definition of bribery:  
 
1. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish 
that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to 
offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that 
official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from 
acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain 
or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business. 
 
2. Each Party shall take any measures necessary to establish that 
complicity in, including incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorisation 
of an act of bribery of a foreign public official shall be a criminal 
offence. Attempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be 
criminal offences to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a 
public official of that Party. 
 
3. The offences set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above are hereinafter 
referred to as “bribery of a foreign public official”. 
 
A “foreign public official” is then defined in Article 1, paragraph 4, to mean  
 
any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a 
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a 
public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or 








public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international 
organisation; … 
       (Emphasis added.) 
 
2.2.2.3  Supporting documents 
 
Public procurement, as such, is nowhere mentioned in the OECD Convention, but the 
official commentary to the Convention states that “public function [in Article 1, 
paragraph 4] includes any activtiy in the public interest, delegated by a foreign country, 
such as the performance of a task delegated by it in connection with public 
procurement.”
68
  The official commentary also mentions public procurement in the 
context of possible sanctions for bribery: 
 
24. Among the civil or administrative sanctions, other than non-criminal 
fines, which might be imposed upon legal persons for an act of bribery of 
a foreign public official are: exclusion from entitlement to public benefits 
or aid; temporary or permanent disqualification from participation in 
public procurement or from the practice of other commercial activities; 
placing under judicial supervision; and a judicial winding-up order. 
       (Emphasis added.) 
 
In 2009, the OECD Council adopted further, detailed recommendations for member 
states.
69
  One recommendation was that each member state should take “concrete and 
meaningful steps” to examine how public procurement contracts (and similar advantages) 
could be denied as a sanction for bribery.
70
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In its most recent assessment of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Transparency 
International reported that only four of 40 signatories to the Convention (the United 
States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland) were actively enforcing the 
Convention; five, including Canada, had moderate enforcement; eight had limited 
enforcement; twenty-two had little or nor enforcement; and one (Iceland) could not be 
classified.
71
  In the same report, TI moved Canada from the “limited” to the “moderate” 
category, one of only two countries to improve (the other was New Zealand, which 
moved from “no” enforcement to “limited” enforcement). 
 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention does not apply directly to Quebec, as a sub-national 
jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, the Convention and its ancillary documents, along with a 
burgeoning literature,
72
 formed an important part of the international context at the time 
Bill 1 was being drafted. 
 
2.2.3 United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
 
2.2.3.1  Ratification 
 
The United Nations Convention Against Convention (UNCAC) was negotiated in 2002-
2003, adopted by the General Assembly in 2003, and entered into force on December 14, 
2005.
73
  The UNCAC is administered through the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC).
74
  A conference of the states parties reviews implementation and 
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Canada signed the UNCAC on May 21, 2004, and ratified it on October 2, 2007.  The 
UNCAC came into force for Canada on November 1, 2007.  Canada did, however, make 
a number of reservations.
76
  One of Canada’s reservations, for example, is with respect to 
Article 20 of the UNCAC, which recommends establishment of the offence of illicit 
enrichment.
77
  Canada filed a reservation, on the grounds that such an offence would be 
contrary to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system. 
 
 
2.2.3.2  Text of the UNCAC 
 
The UNCAC covers some of the same ground as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
but is much broader.  For example, it contains specific commitments with respect to 
public procurement (Article 9, section 1): 
 
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles 
of its legal system, take the necessary steps to establish appropriate 
systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and 
objective criteria in decision-making, that are effective, inter alia, in 
preventing corruption. Such systems, which may take into account 
appropriate threshold values in their application, shall address, inter 
alia: 
 
(a) The public distribution of information relating to procurement 
procedures and contracts, including information on invitations to tender 
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 See online <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2003/12/20031209%2002-
50%20PM/Related%20Documents/CN.981.2007-Eng.pdf>. 
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and relevant or pertinent information on the award of contracts, 
allowing potential tenderers sufficient time to prepare and submit their 
tenders; 
 
(b) The establishment, in advance, of conditions for participation, 
including selection and award criteria and tendering rules, and their 
publication; 
 
(c) The use of objective and predetermined criteria for public 
procurement decisions, in order to facilitate the subsequent verification 
of the correct application of the rules or procedures; 
 
(d) An effective system of domestic review, including an effective system 
of appeal, to ensure legal recourse and remedies in the event that the 
rules or procedures established pursuant to this paragraph are not 
followed; 
 
(e) Where appropriate, measures to regulate matters regarding 
personnel responsible for procurement, such as declaration of interest in 




2.2.3.3  Supporting Documents 
 
There is a “legislative guide” to the UNCAC, published by UNODC.
78
  It does not offer a 
great deal of assistance of this procurement provision, as it consists mainly of a re-
phrasing of the UNCAC’s terms.  It does, however, include this pertinent observation and 
warning: 
 
79. Such [procurement] systems may take into account appropriate 
threshold values in their application, for example in order to avoid 
overly complex procedures for comparatively small amounts. Past 
experience suggests that excessive regulation can be counterproductive 
by increasing rather than diminishing vulnerability to corrupt practices. 
 
        (Emphasis added.) 
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The UNCAC legislative guide also makes an observation that is relevant to a federal state 
such as Canada: 
 
87. Past experience also shows that local authorities can be particularly 
vulnerable to corruption in connection with public procurement, as well 
as real estate, construction, town planning, political financing, etc. The 
requirements of the Convention against Corruption should thus be taken 
into account at all administrative levels.  
 
        (Emphasis added.) 
 
The UNODC also publishes a “technical guide” to the UNCAC, but again, like the 
legislative guide, it adds little to the procurement provisions of the UNCAC.
79
  It does 
contain a useful enumeration of the most common forms of procurement corruption: 
 
Specifically, such a body would undertake or require to be undertaken 
risk assessments of the main areas of potential corruption and fraud, 
including: rigged specifications and procedures; collusive bidding; false 
claims and statements; failure to meet specifications, including use or 
supply of substandard or counterfeit materials; co-mingling of contracts; 
false invoices; duplicate contract payments; contract variation misuse 




The UNCAC does not apply directly to Quebec, as a sub-national jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, the principles of the UNCAC, and the guidance provided to implement it, 
formed an important part of the international context at the time Bill 1 was being drafted. 
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2.2.4 European Union 
 
The European Union (EU) has issued a series of anti-corruption instruments, as well as 
engaging in regular evaluation of anti-corruption efforts in member states.  In the most 
recent EU anti-corruption report,
81
 the following instruments and standards are said to 
have played an important role in setting the terms of reference for assessment: 
 
 UNCAC,  
 The Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the 
OECD, for example: 
o  the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and its 
Additional Protocol,  
o the Civil Law Convention on Corruption,  
o twenty guiding principles for the fight against corruption adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,  
o Council of Europe Recommendations on financing political parties, 
o Council of Europe Recommendations on codes of conduct for public 
officials, and  
o OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
 
This represents a sophisticated understanding of the international context for country-
specific anti-corruption measures.   
 
The EU is also the source of public procurement directives, which have the force of law 
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2.3 CANADIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTRUMENTS 
2.3.1 Criminal Code 
 
The first and most important Canadian legislative response to corruption is the Criminal 
Code.
83
  The most common offences that we associate with corruption—such as bribery, 





There are a couple of Criminal Code provisions dealing specifically with public 
contracts: 
 
121.  (1) Every one commits an offence who 
… 
(f) having made a tender to obtain a contract with the government, 
 
(i) directly or indirectly gives or offers, or agrees to give or offer, 
to another person who has made a tender, to a member of that person’s 
family or to another person for the benefit of that person, a reward, 
advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for the withdrawal of 
the tender of that person, or 
 
(ii) directly or indirectly demands, accepts or offers or agrees to 
accept from another person who has made a tender a reward, advantage 
or benefit of any kind for themselves or another person as consideration 
for the withdrawal of their own tender. 
 
(2) Every one commits an offence who, in order to obtain or retain a 
contract with the government, or as a term of any such contract, whether 
express or implied, directly or indirectly subscribes or gives, or agrees to 
subscribe or give, to any person any valuable consideration 
(a) for the purpose of promoting the election of a candidate or a class or 
party of candidates to Parliament or the legislature of a province; or 
(b) with intent to influence or affect in any way the result of an election 
conducted for the purpose of electing persons to serve in Parliament or 
the legislature of a province. 
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There do not appear to have been any reported cases in which these sections were the 
foundation of the charge. 
 
The only significant federal extension of the Criminal Code provisions is the Corruption 
of Foreign Public Officials Act,
85
 but that law is more about extending the territorial 
reach, rather than the conceptual reach, of Canadian criminal law. 
 
2.3.2 Federal anti-corruption legislation 
 
The Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA)
86
 was enacted for the 
purpose of ratifying the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and to implement Canada’s 




On behalf of the government, Julian Reed, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, called the CFPOA “a dramatic and significant first step in the right 
direction.”
88
  In reply, Bob Mills, Reform MP, did not deal directly with the substance of 
the bill.  Rather he complained “we are ramming it through the last week of parliament. 
There has been very little planning on this bill. … All of a sudden, here it is in the House 
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and we are expected to ram the thing through with little time to look at it.”
89
 And indeed, 
the bill went through all stages in the House of Commons in a single day, namely 
Monday, December 7, 1998. 
 
Although the word “procurement” does not appear anywhere in either the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention or the FCPOA, it is hard to imagine any sensible argument that the 
procurement function is not captured by these two instruments.   
 
As noted earlier, in section 2.2.2.3, the official commentary to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention states that the phrase “public function,” as used in the Convention, includes 
any activity in the public interest, “such as the performance of a task delegated by it [the 
government of a foreign country] in connection with public procurement.”   
 
The CFPOA definition of “foreign public official” is not identical to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention definition, but does track it closely.  Where the Convention refers to 
“any person exercising a public function for a foreign country”, the CFPOA refers to “a 
person who performs public duties or functions for a foreign state.”  It is a reasonable 
conclusion that the CFPOA extends to public procurement, although there has not yet 
been a CFPOA prosecution dealing with procurement. 
 
In fact, there have been remarkably few CFPOA prosecutions at all.  For many years, the 
CFPOA seemed almost a dead letter.  There was a conviction in 2005
90
 in a case 
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described as “minor” and “a simple, straightforward action.”
91
  The next conviction did 
not occur until 2011.
92




The OECD’s Phase 3 report on Canada’s implementation effort, published in March 
2011, was sharply critical of Canada’s anti-corruption effort.
94
  The opening paragraph of 
the OECD news release captures the flavour of the report: 
 
Although Canada has recently made progress in investigating the 
bribery of foreign public officials by Canadian businesses, Canada has 
only completed one prosecution since it enacted its foreign bribery law 
in 1999. A new report by the OECD states that Canada’s regime for 
                                                 
91
 Transparency International Canada Inc., UNCAC Implementation Review: Civil Society 
Organization Report at 46.  The pages of this document are confusingly numbered.  The 
quotation is from page 6 of the appendices, in a document titled “Grading Canada’s 
Record on Compliance with International Obligations.” 
92
 There is no reported decision for the Niko Resources Ltd. case.  In the TI publication 
cited in the previous note, at 8, footnote 46, the facts of the case are described as follows: 
“In 2011, Niko Resources Ltd. pled guilty to offering two bribes valued at US$200,000 to 
the Bangladeshi State Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources. According to the 
(Niko) Agreed Statement of Facts, following explosions at its north-eastern Bangladesh 
natural gas field, Niko provided a vehicle worth approximately $190,000 to the Energy 
Minister in Bangladesh and paid his travel costs of $5,000 to attend an Energy Expo in 
Calgary and for a personal trip to New York. Niko provided these bribes to persuade the 
Minister to exercise his influence to ensure that Niko could obtain a favourable gas 
purchase and sales agreement and to ensure the company would be dealt with fairly in 
relation to claims relating to the gas field explosions. The Court accepted the sentencing 
recommendation, which consisted of a fine and victim surcharge totaling $9,499,000 and 
a probation order. The probation order makes Niko subject to court supervision and 
regular audits to confirm its compliance with the CFPOA.” 
93
 “Nazir Karigar, Air India bribe plotter, sentenced to 3 years in prison,” CBCNews.ca 
mobile (May 24, 2014).  The article also includes the following passage: “Canada has 
faced years of criticism from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the watchdog group Transparency International for having 
‘little or no enforcement’ against companies paying bribes in developing countries, 
despite being a signatory to international anti-bribery conventions.  In 2012, Canada’s 
global ranking improved slightly to acknowledge ‘moderate enforcement’ after the 
RCMP and Quebec provincial police laid a series of charges against executives of SNC-
Lavalin in cases that have yet to come to trial.” 
94
 OECD, Working Group on Bribery, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-




enforcement of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) 




Perhaps in response to this criticism, the CFPOA was amended in 2013 by the Fighting 
Foreign Corruption Act,
96
 which received Royal Assent on June 19, 2013.  The unofficial 
summary provided by the Department of Justice says the amendments: 
 
(a) increase the maximum sentence of imprisonment applicable to the 
offence of bribing a foreign public official; 
(b) eliminate the facilitation payments exception to that offence; 
(c) create a new offence relating to books and records and the bribing of 
a foreign public official or the hiding of that bribery; and 
(d) establish nationality jurisdiction that would apply to all of the 
offences under the Act. 
 
When the CFPOA amendments were introduced, Transparency International issued a 
news release saying that the amendments would “greatly strengthen” the CFPOA.
97
 
Particular mention was made of “nationality jurisdiction”, which gave Canadian courts 
jurisdiction over matters involving a Canadian citizen or permanent resident by deeming 
their actions to have taken place in Canada.  The amendments came into force on Royal 




In its 2011 asssessment, the OECD asked Canada to make an oral report on its 
enforcement efforts within one year, and a written report within two years.  Canada did in 
fact submit a written report dated February 2013, and it was approved by the OECD in 
March 2013.
99
  According to this Phase 3 report submitted by Canada, there were thirty-
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five CFPOA investigations underway.
100
  There is unfortunately no way to verify this 
number, nor the depth or seriousness of the investigations, so it is still difficult to judge 
Canada’s implementation effort. 
 
In any event, the number of investigations, charges, or convictions cannot be an adequate 
measure of implementation effort.  A country that is making no implementation effort, 
and a country whose effort is so strong as to have eliminated foreign bribery by its 
nationals, may both show a low number of investigations, charges, and convictions. 
 
2.3.3 Federal procurement 
 
Another major player in Quebec infrastructure projects is the federal government.  Its 
constituentional jurisdiction extends, for example, to ports, including the Port of 
Montreal.  Public Works Canada changed its own contract processes, apparently in 
response to the revelations at the Charbonneau Commission, but without fanfare:  
 
Le donneur d’ouvrage principal du gouvernement fédéral, le ministère 
des Travaux publics, a discrètement changé ses procédures d’octroi de 
contrats à certaines firmes nommées à la commission Charbonneau. En 
mai, le Ministère a décidé que les contrats accordés à des entreprises 
comme SNC-Lavalin, Genivar, Dessau, Construction DJL ou CIMA+ 
nécessiteraient l’approbation d’un haut fonctionnaire, comme un sous-
ministre adjoint ou un directeur général. Certaines modifications doivent 
aussi être approuvées de la sorte. Jusqu’ici, seule la défunte Agence 
canadienne de développement international (ACDI) avait suivi l’exemple 
de la Banque mondiale et décrété que le géant SNC-Lavalin serait écarté 




[translation: The main giver of contracts in the federal government, the 
Department of Public Works, discreetly changed its procedure for 
awarding contracts to certain companies named at the Charbonneau 
Commission.  In May, the Department decided that contracts awarded to 
companies like SNC-Lavalin, Genivar, Dessau, Construction DJL or 
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CIMA+ would require the approval of a senior official, such as an 
associate deputy minister or an executive director.  Some contract 
amendments would have to be approved the same way.  Until now, only 
the former Canadian International Development Agency followed the 
World Bank’s example and ruled that the giant SNC-Lavalin would be 
debarred from its requests for proposals.] 
 
These changes became controversial only later, after the Globe & Mail reported that 
Hewlett-Packard Canada (HP) might be debarred from federal contracts because of an 




There is no reference, in the federal procurement policy, to co-ordination of anti-
corruption efforts between the federal and provincial governments. 
 
2.4 QUEBEC ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTRUMENTS 
 
When Bill 1 was introduced in October 2012, Quebec already had an extensive set of 
anti-corruption laws.  Bill 1 consists almost entirely of amendments to existing laws.  
One would expect Quebec’s lawmakers to be aware of this local context.  
 
The Act respecting contracting by public bodies
103
 governs public procurement generally.  
Like similar procurement laws across Canada, it is primarily concerned with good 
management of public contracts.  Prior to Bill 1, the Public Contracts Act had the 
following six statutory objectives: 
 
 (1) transparency in contracting processes; 
 
 (2) the honest and fair treatment of tenderers; 
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 (3) the opportunity for qualified tenderers to compete in calls for tenders 
made by public bodies; 
 
 (4) the use of effective and efficient contracting procedures, including 
careful, thorough evaluation of procurement requirements that reflects 
the Government's sustainable development and environmental policies; 
 
 (5) the implementation of quality assurance systems for the goods, 
services or construction work required by public bodies; and 
 
 (6) accountability reporting by the chief executive officers of public 




In its current form, the Public Contracts Act was enacted in 2006, replacing Chapter V of 
the Public Administration Act.
105
  There is a also a long list of regulations under the 
Public Contracts Act. 
 
Another key statute concerning public procurement in the construction industry is the 
Building Act.
106
  The Act is important because a person or company must hold a license 
under the Act if it is to hold itself out as a building contractor, and must not use any sub-
contractor which does not itself hold a license: 
 
46. No person may act as a building contractor, hold himself out to be 
such or give cause to believe that he is a building contractor, unless he 
holds a current licence for that purpose. 
 
No contractor may use, for the carrying out of construction work, the 
services of another contractor who does not hold a licence for that 
purpose. 
 
The licensing system under the Building Act is administered by the Régie du bâtiment du 
Québec (RBQ) [translation: Quebec Building Authority]. 
 
A third key statute is the Elections Act, which dictates how political parties may be 
financed.  The links of construction contractors to political parties has been a recurring 
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theme in Quebec’s corruption scandals, and was a regular feature of the evidence at the 
Charbonneau Commission.  Quebec’s elections law includes limits on the source and 
amount of donations, and reporting requirements.  The Act is administered by the 
Director-General of Elections (DGE). 
 
With these foundations already in place—the Public Contracts Act, the Building Act, and 
the Elections Act—the corruption scandal that started enveloping the Charest government 
led to a flurry of anti-corruption activity in 2011 and into 2012. 
 
First was the announcement of the Escouade Marteau [translation: Hammer Squad], a 





Next, on February 18, 2011, was the announcement of the formation of the Unité 
permanente anti-corruption (UPAC) [translation: Permanent Anti-Corruption Unit].
108
  
The UPAC was said to be “inspired” by New York City’s Department of Investigation.
109
  
The UPAC would co-ordinate the efforts of the following anti-corruption groups already 
operating within the government: 
 
 the Escouade Marteau 
 the expanded anti-collusion unit 
 the investigation unit at the Commission de la construction du Québec (CCQ) 
 the municipal contract management audit unit of the Department of Municipal 
Affairs 
 the corruption and embezzlement investigation unit of Revenue Québec 
 the audit and investigation unit of the Régie du bâtiment du Québec (RBQ). 
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At the same time, the government announced that a team of prosecutors would be formed 
that would be devoted exclusively to UPAC files.  Critics noted that the Director-General 





On March 16, 2011, the Minister of Public Security announced the appointment of 
Robert Lafrenière as the first Anti-Corruption Commissioner.
111
  The UPAC and the 
Commissioner were given formal legal status in the Anti-Corruption Act,
112
 introduced on 
May 11, 2011, and adopted by the National Assembly on June 13, 2011.  Most of it 
entered into force on the same day.
113
  The Anti-Corruption Act also sets up a 
whistleblower regime, and a register of contractors who are ineligible to bid for public 
contracts because of prior convictions for “wrongdoing.” 
 
On October 26, 2011, the Charest government introduced An Act to prevent, combat and 
punish certain fraudulent practices in the construction industry and make other 
amendments to the Building Act (hereafter “Bill 35”).
114
  Bill 35 received Royal Assent 
on December 9, 2011.  Bill 35 is most significant for the provisions that are precursors to 
the key provisions of Bill 1.  For example, the Building Act is amended to add an 
“integrity” criterion to the issuance of a license: 
 
62.0.1. The Board may refuse to issue a licence if issuing the licence 
would be contrary to the public interest, for example because the 
applicant or, in the case of a partnership or a legal person, it or any of 
its officers is unable to prove good moral character and a capacity to 




 “Québec choisit Robert Lafrenière pour diriger l'unité anti-corruption”, Le Devoir (16 
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exercise activities as a contractor with competence and integrity, given 
the past conduct of the applicant or the officer. 
 
The Board may, in that regard, conduct or commission any verifications 
it considers necessary. 
         (Emphasis added.) 
There is an interesting translation point here.  Where the English version of Bill 35 uses 
the word “integrity”, which is the same as Bill 1, the French version of Bill 35 uses the 
word “probité”, which is different from the key word “integrité” used in Bill 1.  One is 
left to wonder whether Bill 35 has precedent value for Bill 1.   To date, there are only a 





Bill 35 also forbids the issuance of a license to a contractor which has an officer or 
shareholder with a conviction, within the previous five years, of a range of offences. 
 
Both the Charest and Marois governments tackled the issue of political party financing, 
which was another element lurking behind the corruption scandals.  The Charest 
government introduced An Act respecting political party leadership campaigns,
116
 which 
amended the Elections Act so as to apply to leadership campaigns financing rules similar 
to those already applying to political parties.  The Marois government, as part of its 
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reform package that included Bill 1, introduced as Bill 2 An Act to amend the Election 
Act.  Bill 2 reduced the elector contribution limit, lowered the ceiling on expenses and 




Despite this panoply of anti-corruption measures,
118
 one of the themes of the Bill 1 
debate is that the existing law is not working.  Stephane Bédard, the minister responsible 
for Bill 1, mentions frequently in the debates that the previous law was too easily 
“contourné”, or evaded.   
 
A final note on the Quebec statutory context. The Charbonneau Commission, in Annex 
IV to its interim report, lists the statutory changes related to the Commission’s mandate 
that were adopted between the date it was formed and the date of its interim report.
119
   
The Commission notes that the constantly changing legal context creates a triple 
challenge for the Commission : 
 
Pour la Commission, cela pose un triple défi.  D’abord, elle doit 
expliquer les stratagèmes et les activités sous enquête en fonction des 
régles qui étaient en vigueur au moment où ils se sont produits, afin de 
montrer comment les régimes alors en place ont été exploités par les 
acteurs.  Ensuite, la Commission doit mettre à jour son objet d’étude au 
fur et à mesure de l’adoption des nouvelles mesures.  Enfin, elle doit 
tenter de les évaluer, pour déterminer si elles contribuent à régler les 
problèmes ou, au contraire, si elles ont pour effet de les exacerber.  Or, 
il n’est pas facile d’évaluer des mesures récentes, puisqu’il faut toujours 
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un certain temps pour apprécier les effets des règles et donc pour savoir 




[Translation: For the Commission, this poses a triple challenge.  First, it 
has to explain the stratagems and activities under inquiry as a function 
of the rules at the moment they occurred, in order to show how the rules 
then in place were exploited by the actors.  Next, the Commission has to 
continuually update what it is considering, as new measures are adopted.  
Finally, it has to try to evaluate the new measures, to determine if they 
are contributing to a solution of the problems or, on the contrary, if they 
are actually making them worse.  It simply is not easy to evaluate the 
recent measures, because it always takes time to note the effect the rules 
are having and to know whether or not they are achieving their 
objectives.] 
 
The parade of anti-corruption laws continues.  In December 2014, for example, the new 
provincial government introduced Bill 26, which created a legal regime for the 
reimbursement of sums obtained through fraudulent contracts.
121
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE AND PRECEDENTS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO ANTI-CORRUPTION LITERATURE 
As we saw in the last chapter, almost all of the national and international anti-corruption 
instruments are of very recent vintage.  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of the 
United States was enacted in 1977.  It was the first major anti-corruptioni instrument in 
any developed country.  The FCPA, in turn, spurred the creation of international anti-
corruption instruments.   
 
Scholarly anti-corruption literature is of similarly recent vintage.  One of the world’s 
leading scholars on corruption, Susan Rose-Ackerman of Yale University, noted in 1978 
that “[anti-corruption] work in economics is especially scanty” and that only basic 
sources were available in political science.
122
  Writing in 1984, in his magisterial 
treatment of bribery, John T. Noonan Jr. observed that “academic lawyers” have had little 




Today, there is an anti-corruption literature so vast as to be almost overwhelming.  Much 
of it comes from what can only be described as an international anti-corruption industry, 
composed of supra-national organizations, NGOs, and consulting firms.  There is a cross-
over of people and ideas between this industry and the academy.  For the sake of 
exposition, however, the anti-corruption literature will be divided into academic and non-
academic streams. 
 
The purpose of this literature review is to have an idea of what “the state of the art” was 
at the time Bill 1 was being developed in Quebec in September and October of 2012.  In 
an evidence-based law-making process, one would expect lawmakers to be aware, even 
in general terms, of the state of the art. 
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3.2 THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
There is a substantial literature, both academic and non-academic, on the law and practice 
of public-sector procurement and its regulation.
124
  This literature extends well beyond 
questions of corruption and anti-corruption.  As pointed out in the UNODC Technical 
Guide to the UNCAC, 
 
It is important to note that public procurement regulation is not about 
anticorruption per se – the common objectives of most procurement 
systems include value for money, integrity, accountability, fair treatment, 
and social/industrial development.  Balancing these objectives, some of 




We can consider the literature on corruption in public-sector procurement to be one 
strand of this broader procurement literature. 
 
One of the foremost scholars of corruption, Susan Rose-Ackerman, published 
Corruption: A Study in Political Economy in 1978.
126
  It is a seminal work, attempting to 
unify the insights of economics and political science in the context of corruption.  The 
rest of Rose-Ackerman’s distinguished career can be understood as the working-out of 
the analytical framework established in her first book.   
 
Rose-Ackerman’s “central methodological task” is to “develop a set of analytic 
techniques that combine an economist’s concern with modeling self-interested behavior 
with a political scientist’s recognition that political and bureaucratic institutions provide 
incentive structures far different from those presupposed by the competitive market 
paradigm.”
127
  While recognizing that citizen–government interactions take many forms, 
Rose-Ackerman notes “I shall always keep bribery in the analytic foreground.”  She 
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acknowledges “the importance of variations in individual scruples and accepted 




As early as this first book in 1978, Rose-Ackerman sounds a warning which the Quebec 
government could usefully have taken into account in 2012: 
 
A practical difficulty in instituting an appropriate corruption-reducing 
strategy is the fragmentation of authority over law enforcement policies, 
personnel policies, changes in internal organization, and structural 
remedies.  Hence the tradeoffs in anticorruption policy are seldom 
perceived, or if perceived, seldom acted upon.  This often leads to a 
strategy of “following the scandals” rather than a broader look at the 
range of alternatives available and a more fundamental reappraisal of 
the role of private influence and of quasi-market schemes on the whole 




Following in Rose-Ackerman’s footsteps, the later academic literature on corruption is 
dominated by economists.
130
    
 
The domination of anti-corruption literature by economists means that this body of 
literature uses concepts and tools that can seem foreign to most lawyers, legal academics, 
and law-makers.  Take, for example, the following paragraph, written by a pair of 
economists, which freely mixes economic and legal concepts: 
 
For corruption to continue to thrive, three elements must co-exist. First, 
someone must have discretionary power. Defined broadly, this power 
would include authority to design and administer regulations in a 
discretionary manner. Second, there must be economic rents associated 
with this power. Moreover, the rents must be such that identifiable 
groups could acquire those rents. Third, the legal/judicial system must be 
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such that there is a sufficiently low probability of detection and/or 




While legal scholars tend to assume that corruption is undesirable, economics scholars 
can be more sanguine, treating corruption as a neutral economic phenomenon.  There is a 
strand of the literature that points out that certain kinds and levels of corruption may, at 
least in theory, increase the overall efficiency of a particular procurement.  For example, 
economists tend to focus on concepts like efficiency, which refers to maximizing the 
amount by the which the value of outputs exceed the cost of inputs.  There is no moral 
judgment involved.  Thus an economist can conclude that, under certain conditions, some 




  In another economics paper, 
the author does not say that financing political parties with the fruits of procurement 
corruption is wrong; rather, the author remarks that it is “socially inefficient.”
134
  
Similarly, some economists question whether a “zero tolerance” policy is really a good 
idea.  This idea is a hard sell for politicians, police and the public, but only because they 
misread the economist’s concept of “efficiency” as meaning “acceptable” or “desirable” 
or “morally neutral”. 
 
Almost all of the economics literature is theoretical.  There is not much in the way of 
empirical research, because it is the nature of corruption that it is illegal, and therefore 
hidden, and therefore not amenable to controlled experiments in the field.  A theme 
running through the literature is the difficulty of measurement.  It is difficult or 
impossible to measure how much corruption there is, or to measure the effectiveness of 
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anti-corruption strategies.  Tabish and Jha have already been quoted on this point.
135
  
Another set of authors put it this way: 
 
There are no straightforward methods to measure corruption due to the 
illicit nature of the issue and imprecise definition of what exactly should 




Another author puts it this way: 
 
It is not possible to assess the extra cost [of the allocative inefficiency 
caused by corruption] by classical survey techniques because nobody 
knows what would have been the final purchase cost if the most efficient 




Thus Tabish and Jha, writing as recently as 2011, are able to point out the lack of 
empirical support for the theoretical analyses: 
 
The state of research on corruption is such that there is little inductive 
theory or statistical evidence about the kinds of policies that work under 
particular conditions.  Neither is there much analysis of how corruption 
has been or might be reduced or how to identify it.  Unfortunately, the 
construction industry continues to rely heavily on traditional preventive 
and punitive measures.  This implies that the mechanism of measuring 
the anti-corruption performance or arresting corruption in construction 




Later in the same paper, the authors write the following: 
 
The field of corruption in public sector construction has remained a 
relatively underresearched area. Those measures to combat corruption 
that have been suggested by institutions and individuals have been based 
on their gut feelings and the application of such measures is restricted to 
the specific cases in which the institutions or the individuals were 
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involved. Very limited research has been carried out to examine the 





Kleinig and Heffernan give as good a summary as any of the academic literature: 
 
Not unexpectedly, the weight of opinion opposes corruption, however 
conceived, whether it is of the public or private kind.  Yet, even when 
there is agreement about its identity, there is little agreement about how 
it should be prevented, controlled, or eradicated.  Is corruption 
amenable to legal solutions or more broadly political and administrative 
strategies?  Do democratic and republican polities deal with corruption 
more effectively and acceptably than authoritarian or oligarchic ones?  
Or are all formal strategies like porous cloth, no more than temporary 
obstacles to self-servingness?  Should corruption be seen instead as a 
culturally transmitted disease, requiring the reformation of traditions 
and social attitudes more than formalized constraints; and, if so, how 




Perhaps because of the lack of empirical study to support economic theory, the moral 
judgment (“all corruption is bad”) appears to be winning out.  Thus Linarelli, writing in 
1998, is able to say “The trend…is to condemn corruption as bad for economic growth 
and for the sustainability of institutions that facilitate development.”
141
  And this is, 
indeed, the underlying premise of most of the non-academic literature, to which we now 
turn. 
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3.3 THE NON-ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
 
There are several streams of non-academic literature on corruption in public-sector 
procurement: supra-national organizations; non-governmental organizations; professional 
advisors; popular literature; and the daily press. 
 
In the last section, on the academic literature, several themes were identified.  These 
themes are taken up often in the non-academic literature.  One might even say they are 
amplified, because the non-academic literature is not always operating under the 
constraints that mark the academic literature, such as careful delineation of methodology, 
and reference and comparison to the existing body of literature. 
 
For example, one of the themes identified in the academic literature is the difficulty in 
measuring corruption.  Even though this difficulty may be mentioned—for example, a 
recent EU Anti-Corruption Report says “The total economic costs of corruption cannot 
easily be calculated”
142
—the non-academic literature is full of attempts to estimate the 
cost of corruption.  The point, it seems, is to stress the importance of the issue as a 
prelude to discussing it. 
 
Other common tropes in the non-academic literature are the complexity of the problem
143
 
and the difficulty of finding effective solutions.
144
  Because these themes are so common, 
the following sections on the various kinds of non-academic literature do not specifically 
repeat them. 
 
                                                 
142
 EU Anti-Corruption Report, note 34 above, at 3, footnote 3. This report suggests that 
corruption imposes an annual cost of EUR 120 billion on the EU economy. 
143
 For example, the quotation from the EU Anti-Corruption Report (February 2014), 
cited above in the text accompanying note 34 above. 
144
 Ibid: “An effective policy response cannot be reduced to a standard set of measures; 
there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution”.  In the UNODC’s legislative guide to the UNCAC, 
note 78 above, at v: “Since the causes of corruption are many and varied, preventive, 





3.3.1 Supra-national organizations 
 
Most of the writing on corruption is being produced by supra-national organizations like 
the United Nations, the World Bank, the OECD, and the EU.  University-based scholars 
are contracted to do some of this work, so in a sense it represents the merging of 
academic and non-academic literature. 
 
3.3.1.1   United Nations 
 
The United Nations has assigned secretariat duties for the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC) to its Vienna-based United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC).  The UNODC is therefore the source of much of the official UNCAC 
literature.   
 
Apart from publishing the official UNCAC text, the UNODC publishes the “Legislative 
guide for the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.”
145
  
The stated purpose of this guide is “to assist States seeking to ratify and implement the 
Convention by identifying legislative requirements, issues arising from those 
requirements and various options available to States as they develop and draft the 
necessary legislation.”
146
  The purpose of the guide is to achieve a degree of consistency 
across member states, while recognizing different legal traditions and stages of 
development.
147
   
 
The UNODC also publishes a “technical guide” to the UNCAC.  This guide, published in 
2009, is a good but high-level survey of the elements of a well-functioning procurement 
system.  The guide mentions debarment as a possible sanction for corrupt conduct, 
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In September 2011, the UNODC launched a web-based portal called “Tools and 
Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge” or TRACK.
149
  This website promises to 
provide “up-to-date information on national legislation implementing the Convention.” 
 
The most recent review of Canada’s UNCAC implementation is dated February 13, 2014, 
and was presented to a meeting of the Implementation Review Group in Vienna in June 
2014.
150
  This review includes the following description of how Canada’s federal 
structure affects treaty implementation: 
 
Canada is a federal state comprising 10 provinces … and three 
territories …. While the ratification of international treaties falls under 
federal jurisdiction, their implementation, where necessary, includes the 
participation of all levels of government. As a State party that follows a 
dualist tradition for implementing its treaty obligations, a treaty cannot 
as a general rule be invoked as a source of law in a Canadian court 
unless it has been transformed or implemented into Canadian law, 
usually by legislation.  
   
In other words, the Government of Canada can speak only to what it is doing to 
implement the UNCAC.  The review document examines all relevant federal laws, 
especially the Criminal Code, but it does not touch, at all, on provincial efforts.  This 
review was issued after Bill 1 was adopted, so its analysis was obviously not available to 
Bill 1’s drafters. 
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3.3.1.2  World Bank 
 
The World Bank is a supra-national organization set up by member states.  It consists of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA).  The World Bank Group includes the World Bank plus 
three more supra-national agencies: the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
151
   
 
The significance of the World Bank and the World Bank Group for corruption in public-
sector procurement is that they are major funders of large-scale infrastructure projects 
around the developing world.  They describe the genesis of their anti-corruption efforts 
this way: 
 
The World Bank’s Articles of Agreement require the institution to make 
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of Bank financing are used for 
their intended purposes and with due attention to economy and 
efficiency.  This fundamental requirement is often referred to as the 
‘fiduciary duty’, which forms the legal and policy basis for much of the 





Despite the fact that these words have appeared in the Articles of Agreement since the 
World Bank was formed in 1945, it is generally agreed that the “decisive turning point” 
was a speech by World Bank president James Wolfensohn in 1996 in which he called on 
the World Bank to “deal with the cancer of corruption.”
153
  Work on a formal sanctions 
process began the same year.
154
 
                                                 
151
 For more information about the World Bank and the World Bank Group, see online 
<www.worldbank.org/en/about>. 
152
 Anne-Marie Leroy and Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and 
Its Recent Reforms (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2012) at 1. 
153
 Ibid at 9.  See also World Bank, Office of Suspension and Debarment, Report on 
Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
2014) at 8. 
154





The World Bank has developed its own taxonomy of corruption-related offences.  There 
are standardized definitions for four types of corruption: corrupt practice, fraudulent 
practice, collusive practice, and coercive practice.
155
  In addition, there is a fifth category 
of sanctionable practice known as obstructive practice, which relates to interference, or 
lack of co-operation, with a World Bank anti-corruption investigation.
156
  This taxonomy 
seems designed more for reporting purposes than anything else, as there appears no 
difference in procedure or sanctions for the different categories.  Moreover, the taxonomy 
may not be practically useful, as “fraudulent practice” dominates the other categories, 
with 86% of the cases having at least one claim under this category.  The next largest 




The World Bank has developed an elaborate set of internal processes for sanctioning 
corruption.  Although the World Bank says it has looked carefully at other international 
and national sanctions regimes, and has tried to take into account different legal and 
cultural traditions, its sanctions system is not exactly like any other system: 
 
…the World Bank’s sanctions process is not identical with any single 
corresponding administrative or judicial process in domestic or national 
law. Thus, for example, the Bank’s sanctions process is considerably 
more elaborate than most administrative schemes, vesting as it does a 
quasi-investigative function in INT, placing the ‘burden of proof’ on INT 
(rather than requiring Respondents to demonstrate that they are 
‘presently responsible’), and conferring quasi-judicial functions upon the 
EO and Sanctions Board. The fact that it is concerned with activities that 
are criminal in most countries also inevitably colors the way in which the 
Bank, Respondents, and stakeholders alike view the sanctions process. 
For these reasons, internal reviews and audits of the sanctions process 
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The World Bank has released a detailed report on its suspension and debarment decisions 
from 2007 to 2013,
159
 and there is an on-line database of debarred firms
160
 and debarment 
decisions.
161
   
 
The most significant point, for purposes of the present thesis, is that the World Bank 
consciously chose not to attempt a system of pre-qualification, preferring instead a 
system of sanctions for proven misconduct.  The closest the World Bank comes is a 
system for early temporary suspension, instituted in 2009, to prevent companies under 
investigation from winning and executing World Bank contracts.  Even here, exclusion is 




As a supra-national agency, the World Bank cannot lay down criminal or quasi-criminal 
sanctions.  It is dealing at the intersection of contract law, tort law, trust law, and 
administrative law.  In essence, when responding to corruption, the World Bank is 
making decisions about with whom it will contract.  The World Bank’s principal 
weapon—the default sanction—is “debarment”, which is a prohibition on bidding on or 
holding a World Bank contract.  The power of this sanction is amplified by a reciprocal 
debarment arrangement with other development banks—the African Development Bank 
Group, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank.  Pursuant to the Agreement 
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for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, signed on April 9, 2010, to be debarred 
by one is to be debarred by all.
163
   
 
Most recently, the World Bank has emphasized the need for international co-operation: 
 
As the president of the World Bank announced recently at a panel we 
hosted in Washington DC, “Corruption is public enemy number one”, 





The World Bank system is not without problems.  Some private lawyers, especially in the 
United States, have expressed concern, given the financial consequences of a suspension 
or debarment ruling, that the World Bank isn’t “required to follow any nation’s rules of 




3.3.1.3  OECD 
 
The OECD has published a number of anti-corruption documents which collectively form 
an impressive body of literature.  In 2007, the OECD boasted that “over the last 10 years, 
the OECD has become the leading source of anticorruption tools and expertise in areas 
including business, taxation, export credits, development aid, and governance.”
166
   
 
At least one major player in the Quebec construction industry agrees with the OECD’s 
self-assessment.  Luc Martin, executive vice-president of the Corporation des 
entrepreneurs généraux du Québec (CEGQ), said in 2014 “À trois reprises, on est allés à 
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 “World Bank combats corruption—but questions linger about process”, FCPA Blog, 
May 22, 2014. 
166
 OECD, Bribery in Public Procurement: Methods, Actors and Counter-Measures, 




l’OCDE, et je peux vous dire qu’en comparaison, ici, en matière de contrôle, on 




One stream of documents is the regular self-assessment and peer assessment of progress, 
something contemplated by the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.  There is an extensive, 
public literature of country reports from the OECD.  The OECD has itself published 
guidance on good practices for companies.
168
  The second edition of an article-by-article 
legal commentary was published in February 2014.
169
  The first edition would have been 




An earlier OECD publication is Bribery in Public Procurement: Methods, Actors and 
Counter-Measures,
171
 which is an overview of corruption in public procurement: 
 
It summarises the techniques and means used to bribe, examines the 
relationship between bribery and other crimes as well as the motivations 
of those offering and accepting bribes. It also offers insights into the 
prevention, detection and sanction of bribery. Finally, pertinent cases on 




The report uses a “functional, process-based analysis” to help define counter-measures to 
bribery.
173
  And as the report notes, “Governments must lead the fight against bribery and 
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The most recent OECD Anti-Corruption Report, from 2013, sounds a warning that is 
highly relevent to Quebec lawmakers:  
 
The Report shows that, while almost all countries took steps to reform 
their procurement systems between 2008 and 2012, these efforts have 
mostly focused on legislative changes. Only half of the countries 
surveyed undertook reforms going beyond the tendering process, 
whereas the OECD Recommendation urges countries to address the 
whole cycle, from needs assessment to the award stage, contract 
management and final payment.   
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Annex A to the report contains the OECD’s 2008 recommendations on promoting 
integrity in public-sector procurement.  This would have represented “the state of the art” 




3.3.1.4  European Union 
 
The European Union (EU) is the author of a number of instruments and guidance on anti-
corruption measures. 
 
First and foremost, it is the source of the public procurement directives which have the 
force of law in member states.  These directives, by their nature, incorporate anti-
corruption measures.  In 2011, a proposal was put forward for reform of EU procurement 
law.
176
  This reform proposal represented “the state of the art” of procurement law at the 
time Bill 1 was being drafted and debated.  For example, there is a reference in the 
document to “self-cleaning” by companies found to have engaged in corrupt practices. 
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Cecilia Malmstrom, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, gave a speech at an anti-
corruption conference in March 2013, in which she presaged future directions for the 
EU’s anti-corruption efforts.  The following is a key point: “We do not see new EU 
legislation on corruption as the way forward at this stage.”
177
  According to Malmstrom, 
the necessary instruments are in place, and the emphasis should be on moving from 
intention to action. 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report released on February 3, 2014, is the elaboration of the 
approach outlined by Commissioner Malmstrom in her speech.
178
  It is a smart, 
sophisticated assessment of the state of the art, including a frank assessment of the 
methodological challenges.
179
  The report also introduces the concept of “the 
sustainability of an anti-corruption agenda.”  This is a useful phrase, which captures the 
idea that an anti-corruption agenda can start—for example, with legislation introduced in 
response to public outcry over corruption—but then tail off.  
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report repeats the key point from the Malmstrom speech, 
namely that more legislation is not the way forward: 
 
EU Member States have in place most of the necessary legal instruments 
and institutions to prevent and fight corruption.  However, the results 
they deliver are not satisfactory across the EU.  Anti-corruption rules 
are not always vigorously enforced, systemic problems are not tackled 
effectively enough, and the relevant institutions do not always have 
sufficient capacity to enforce the rules.  Declared intentions are still too 
distant from concrete results, and genuine political will to eradicate 




The report puts a special focus on procurement because it is “of crucial importance for 
the internal market; it is covered by extensive EU legislation, and subject to significant 
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  There is also an appendix which neatly lays out the methodological 
challenges of measuring and fighting corruption. 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report briefly discusses “blacklists” (debarment lists) as a 
sanction: 
 
As for black lists, only a third of countries require using them because of 
the risk of manipulation or lack of sufficient evidence of companies’ 
involvement in corrupt activities. One example is Portugal, which has 
defined the conditions for excluding tenderers from procurement 
procedures in Article 55 of the Code of Public Contracts.
182
 
       (Footnotes omitted.) 
 
In a footnote to this passage, the report notes the use of debarment databases by 
international agencies such as the Asian Development Bank, and that “more than 45 
country agencies and 13 development institutions have been given access to the 
database.” 
 
3.3.2 Non-governmental organizations 
 
A second and large stream of literature is from non-governmental anti-corruption 
organizations.  There is a long list of such organizations, some quite sophisticated and 
apparently well-funded. 
 
Especially prominent is Transparency International.  The current Chair of the TI Board of 
Directors is Huguette Labelle, a Canadian (though not a Québécoise).  
 
TI produces the annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the most widely-used and 
widely-cited comparitive measure of corruption.  Although the CPI is subject to ongoing 
methodological debate, and has been revised over the years in response to that debate, no 
better comparitive measure has been produced in the literature.  TI also produces the 
                                                 
181
 Ibid at 4. 
182




Bribe Payers Index, the Global Corruption Barometer, and National Integrity System 
assessments. 
 
TI also produces a wide variety of other anti-corruption documents, which reflect TI’s 
long experience and relatively deep resources, if not academic heft.  TI is primarily 
aiming at a non-academic audience.  One recent publication from TI’s United Kingdom 




TI also publishes a range of anti-corruption documents focusing specifically on 
corruption in construction projects.
184
  The introduction to these resources emphasizes the 
importance of co-operation : 
 
Transparency International (TI) believes that corruption on construction 
projects can only be eliminated if all participants in construction 
projects co-operate in the development and implementation of effective 
anti-corruption actions which address both the supply and demand sides 
of corruption. These participants include governments, funders, project 
owners, contractors, consultants, and suppliers, and the business and 
professional associations which represent these parties. 
 
One long-running campaign is “Publish What You Pay” (PWYP), launched in 2002, and 
later amended to add “…and What You Extract.”  The extractive industries—oil and gas, 
and mining—are, like public-sector infrastructure projects, especially vulnerable to 
corruption because of the large sums involved.  PWYP is an initiative with the premise 
that transparency in payments permits citizens to hold their governments to account for 
revenue received.
185
  An important part of PWYP’s work is contract transparency. 
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The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is another initiative that appears 
to have had some success.
186
  It is described thus by the Government of Canada: 
 
The EITI is an international standard for resource revenue reporting and 
disclosure that aims to combat corruption, ensure greater transparency 
and better governance of a country’s oil and mining resources. 
Launched in 2002, EITI operates as a coalition of governments, 
industries, investors, and international and non-governmental agencies 
that support improved governance in resource-rich countries through the 
full publication and verification of company payments and government 




On June 12, 2013, in the context of a meeting of G-8 leaders in the United Kingdom, 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that  
 
Canada will be establishing new mandatory reporting standards for 
Canadian extractive companies with a view to enhancing transparency 




Consultations were promised “over the coming months” with provincial governments, 
First Nations leaders, industry and civil society organizations, but as of the date of 
writing (January 2015), there has been no further announcement on the progress of talks 
towards establishing such standards.  Canada is still not a member of the EITI, nor is it 
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suggesting there could be improved disclosure rules for share ownership to reduce money 
laundering, terrorist financing and tax evasion.” 
189




In February 2014, a consortium of international NGOs launched a new global campaign 
called “Stop Secret Contracts.”  Led by the Open Knowledge Foundation, the campaign 
was supported by (among others) Transparency International, Global Witness, Integrity 




Another multi-stakeholder initiative is the Open Contracting Partnership.
191
  The OCP is 
a relatively new organization which is currently in the process of organizing as a stand-
alone office.  Its major sponsors include the World Bank.  An example of its work is the 
Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS), which “aims to enhance and promote 
disclosure and participation in public contracting.”  Having a data standard will allow 
direct comparison of contract awards and performance. 
 
Yet another initiative, formed by private corporations, is the World Economic Forum.  
The WEF describes itself as “an international institution committed to improving the state 
of the world through public–private cooperation.”
192
  It has formed a Partnership Against 
Corruption Initative (PACI) task force.  The task force’s focus is “how the global anti-
corruption agenda can be aligned and the current slew of initiatives can be better 
coordinated.”
193
  There are two significant points here: first, the recognition that there is, 
in fact, a “slew” of anti-corruption initiatives; and second, the need for alignment and co-
ordination.  Dezenski adds this prescient warning: 
 
…corruption is sophisticated, fast-moving and dynamic—and regulatory 
institutions often lag behind. Greater alignment and coordination of the 
many fragmented anti-corruption initiatives being embarked upon 
around the world is the only way to tackle that challenge successfully. 
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Finally, mention should be made of U4, which describes itself as “a web-based resource 
centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption 
challenges in their work.”  U4 is operated by the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway, 
hence the website location <www.U4.no>.  U4 is funded by nine national international 
development agencies. 
 
3.3.3 Professional advisors and private firms 
 
Another significant stream of non-academic anti-corruption literature is from professional 
advisors.  Accounting and management advisory firms
194
 and law firms
195
 publish 
literature on best practices and compliance. 
 
Spurred by FCPA prosecutions, some of the leading work on anti-corruption compliance 
is being done by, and within, international corporations.  For example, Wal-Mart, stung 
by revelations about bribery in Mexico, reviewed and revised its worldwide compliance 
systems.  The result is described by one FCPA observer as “stunning” and “a complex, 
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3.3.4 Popular literature 
 
A fourth stream of corruption literature is what might be called “popular” literature, 
written by individuals who are promoting, to a general audience, the anti-corruption 
cause.  In this stream would be recent books by Transparency International activists 
Laurence Cockcroft
197
 and Frank Vogl,
198
 and the multi-platform campaign by Charmian 




3.3.5 Daily press 
 
A fifth stream of corruption literature is the daily press and, in the modern era, Internet 
blogs.  The illegality of corruption produces a seemingly endless stream of stories.  TI 
produces the “Daily Corruption News,” a compilation of international corruption stories.  
There is also “Corporate Embezzler”, “Whistleblower Today”, “the FCPA Blog”, and 
“The Ethical Alliance Daily”, among others, which compile, analyze, and relay 
corruption news from media outlets around the world. 
 
This stream was particularly lively in Quebec during the hearings of the Charbonneau 
Commission.  The hearings produced a daily stream of characters, incidents, and analysis.  
For an extended period, Quebec’s newspapers covered corruption almost daily.   
 
3.4 THE CASE OF NEW YORK CITY 
New York City provides probably the best, clearest precedent for anti-corruption efforts 
in public-sector procurement.
200
  There are remarkable parallels to the situation in 
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Quebec.  Furthermore, New York City’s population of 8.4 million, and its annual capital 
budget of about $6 billion, makes it roughly the same size as Quebec.  If Bill 1’s drafters 
were going to look somewhere for guidance, New York City would be a leading 
candidate. 
 
A growing controversy in the 1980s over construction corruption in New York City led to 
the appointment by the state governor, in 1985, of an Organized Crime Task Force.  
Crucially, the Task Force did not focus solely on investigation and prosecution—
although there was plenty of both—but also included, as an essential part of its mandate, 
a deep study of the historical, economic, labour, and social roots of corruption in the 
construction industry.
201
  The Task Force reported its results in 1990.
202
  The task force 
exposed deep-rooted patterns of extortion, bribery, illegal cartels, and bid-rigging.  
Unions, which controlled labour supply, were a critical element of the corruption. 
 
As a result of the Task Force report, new processes were implemented.  The new 
processes are complex and interrelated, but they include pre-bid vetting, consistent 
contractual language, central control over contracts by the Mayor’s Office of Contract 
Services, a central contract database, a system for receiving tips and complaints, and a 
system of independent “monitors” to oversee contract administration.  The monitors are 
paid for by the contractors and have total access to the site and to the contractor’s offices 
and staff.   
 
In addition, the longstanding Department of Investigations (DOI) was reinvigorated.  The 
DOI, first created in the 1870s in the wake of an earlier scandal, is a mayoral agency, led 
by a commissioner.  Following revisions of the city charter in 1989, the commissioner is 
nominated by the mayor but approved by New York City Council, and may not be 
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summarily dismissed.  The DOI’s mandate is to investigate wrongdoing, but it also places 
considerable importance on recommending process improvements and ensuring that 




The pre-vetting that is part of the New York contract system does not, itself, result in 
many firms being disqualified.  In 2011, there were eighteen companies deemed “non-
responsible”—that is, not eligible to contract with the city—and in 2012 there were 
twelve.  Compared to the many thousands of companies and contracts awarded in any 
given year, that number is very low.  Nevertheless, the vetting system brings to light a 
variety of issues, such as unpaid fines, that the contractor can clear up.
204
  The city’s 
policy is “to have as many people in the bid pool as possible,” so there is no debarment as 




The anti-corruption efforts in New York City have spawned an extensive literature,
206
 
and also debate about which people and instruments played the most important roles.
207
  
The Charbonneau Commission acknowledged New York City’s success when it invited 
two leaders of the New York City integrity system to give evidence before the 
commission.  It was the only jurisdiction so invited. 
 
3.5 THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION 
One of the oddities, in studying corruption, is that more effort than ever before is being 
directed at reducing corruption, and yet the results of that effort are, at best, difficult to 
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discern.  To put it bluntly, nobody seems too sure of what is working, and what is wasted 
or even counter-productive effort. 
 
Here are a few very recent examples of the (apparent) persistence of corruption: 
 
 Transparency International’s news release on the 2013 Corruption Perceptions 
Index opens with these words: “Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2013 offers a warning that the abuse of power, secret dealings 
and bribery continue to ravage societies around the world.”  
 Speaking in December 2013, the president of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim, 
referred to corruption as “public enemy number one” in the developing world.
208
 
 Two economists wrote in 2011 that “Despite the efforts made to curb corruption, 
it has reached epidemic proportions and is becoming one of the major challenges 




Laurence Cockcroft, one of TI’s founders, sums up his recent (2012) book this way: 
 
This book will show that, in spite of some progress, all forms of action in 
combating corruption have a long way to go.  The international 
community needs to recognize that reform of corruption to date has been 
extremely limited, that momentum needs to be maintained, and that the 
challenges of this century can only be met successfully if the corruption 
dimension is built into policy and action.  Without this, action to combat 
it at country level will be flawed, and progress on the issues of the 
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These are strong words—“ravage”, “public enemy”, “epidemic.”  And yet reform of 
corruption has been “extremely limited.”  How can it be that so much effort is being 
directed against corruption, and yet so much remains? 
 
As is the case with stories about rising crime, more than one explanation is possible.  
Perhaps corruption “continues to ravage societies around the world” because more 
attention is being paid to it, and it is being reported better than before.  Perhaps anti-
corruption measures really are making a difference, and the ravages of corruption would 
be significantly worse without them.  Or maybe the current array of anti-corruption 
measures are ineffective, and are, like corruption itself, a waste of precious public 
resources.   
 
At the very least, the persistence of corruption, in the face of unprecedented efforts to 
stamp it out, should serve as a warning to lawmakers: there are no easy answers, and 
more legislation may well be counter-productive. 
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
There is a vast and growing literature on how to fight corruption.  There is little 
agreement in the literature about what corruption is, other than the fact that it is a 
complex phenomenon.  Neither is there agreement in the literature about which steps are 
most likely to reduce or eliminate corruption.  If there is agreement, it is only that there is 
no simple answer, and that there is a need for co-ordination of the various anti-corruption 
initiatives around the world. 
 
The most sophisticated players in the anti-corruption industry around the world are the 
World Bank, the OECD, and the European Union.  Each has produced an impressive 
body of work.  The World Bank is the leader on sanctions, and most recently has 
emphasized the need for international co-ordination of rather fragmented anti-corruption 
efforts.  The OECD is writing candid reports about its members’ efforts to enforce its 




that its legislative efforts have gone far enough, and that the focus should shift to 
implementation and enforcement of existing rules. 
 
From an enforcement perspective, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is 
vigorously enforced.  Management practices are affected indirectly, by way of attempts to 
forestall an FCPA prosecution, or mitigate an FCPA punishment. The vigorous 
enforcement of the FCPA has created a burgeoning compliance industry.  In comparison, 
enforcement of Canada’s obligations under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
specifically the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA), has been almost 
non-existent. 
 
The fuzzy international picture becomes clearer, though perhaps only a little, when the 
focus narrows to corruption specifically in public-sector procurement.  There is 
agreement that large-scale construction projects are particularly prone to corruption, both 
because of the large amounts of money involved, and because a large construction project 
is such a complex undertaking that there are many points at which corruption can enter 
and be hidden. 
 
New York City offers a particularly sophisticated and close-to-home example of how to 
tackle a thoroughly corrupt construction industry.  The 1990 report of the Organized 
Crime Task Force resulted in process changes that made New York City a leader in the 
field of anti-corruption in public procurement. 
 
Given everything that has been written to this point, an evidence-based law-making 
process might reasonably be expected to see Quebec’s lawmakers consider at least the 
following questions:  
 





 Outline of the legal context: What is the existing legal context (international and 
national anti-corruption instruments) for corruption in public-sector procurement, 
and how does a new law fit in that context? 
 Survey of the literature: What guidance is provided by the existing academic and 
non-academic literature on fighting corruption in public-sector procurement? 
 Survey of practical experience: What guidance is provided by practical experience 
in fighting corruption in other jurisdictions, such as the World Bank, the OECD, 
the EU, and New York City? 
 Evaluation of effectiveness: Assuming the approach embodied in Bill 1 is 
supported by context, the literature, and experience, how will the operation of the 
new law be monitored, and how will success be measured?  
 










CHAPTER 4 QUEBEC’S BILL 1 AS A CASE STUDY OF ANTI-
CORRUPTION LAW-MAKING 
4.1 SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS IN CANADA 
Every Canadian legislature works roughly the same way.  Each is based on a 
Westminster model of procedure.   
 
Anyone can propose a new law in the form of a “bill.” The bill can do something new, or 
it can amend or repeal an existing law.  In order to become a law, a bill must go through 
three stages. These are called “readings,” but the bill is not literally read aloud. The 
introduction of the bill is “first reading.” The bill’s sponsor stands and reads the title. The 
bill is then copied and distributed to all members. Approval in principle is “second 
reading.” That’s when most of the debate occurs. During second reading debate, any 
member can stand to argue for or against the bill. If a bill passes second reading, it moves 
on to a committee that hears from the public and examines the bill clause by clause. Final 
approval is “third reading.” And once a bill passes third reading, it becomes law when the 
Lieutenant-Governor signs it (“Royal Assent”). It enters into force on Royal Assent, 
unless the bill specifies a different date or permits the government to choose a date.  
There are small variations in this procedure across Canada, especially at the committee 




The reality is that most bills with any chance of adoption are proposed by the 
government.  Government bills have a sponsoring minister, whose department is 
responsible for the background policy work and the drafting instructions.  Regardless of 
whether the House has a majority or minority government, there is always a ministry 
responsible for a government bill, and always a sponsoring minister.  Other members 
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may propose a bill, of course, but they are not government bills.  They are referred to as 
“private members’ public bills.” 
 
Another reality is that there is, in Canada, tight party discipline on voting.  A government 
bill is very likely, almost certain, to be supported by every member of the government 
caucus.  If the government caucus has a majority of members in the House, then the 
sponsoring minister, effectively, controls and speaks on behalf of them all. 
 
It is for this reason that the courts, if they accept Hansard evidence at all, are most likely 
to cite only excerpts from the sponsoring minister’s second reading speech (approval in 
principle).
212
  That minister’s intention comes closest to representing, or at least being a 
proxy for, the intention of a majority of members of the House. 
 
But in a minority government, the sponsoring minister cannot claim to be the directing 
mind of a majority of the House.  This was the situation in Quebec at the time of Bill 1’s 
passage.  The standings in the House after the 2012 election were: Parti Québécois (PQ) 
54, Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) 50, Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) 19, Québec 
Solidaire (QS) 2. 
  
4.2 BILL 1: THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS  
As its name implies, Bill 1 was the first bill introduced by the PQ government in its first 
legislative session after forming the government in September 2012. The PQ ministry 
was sworn in on September 19, 2012.  According to Minister Bédard, he and a team of 
lawyers, principally from the Conseil du trésor [translation: Treasury Board], 
immediately set to work on Bill 1, and devoted long hours to getting it ready for the fall 
sitting of the National Assembly, which started only six weeks later.   
 
Second reading (approval in principle) was given on November 20, 2012.  The bill was 
referred to the National Assembly’s Commission des finances publics [translation: 
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Standing Committee on Public Finance, hereafter “Standing Committee”], which held 
four days of public hearings.  The Standing Committee held a further eight sessions of 
clause-by-clause study, at which dozens of amendments were introduced, debated, and 
voted upon. 
 
Bill 1 received third reading in the National Assembly on December 7, 2012, and the 
Lieutenant Governor gave Royal Assent later the same day.  Most of Bill 1 entered into 




Because the PQ formed a minority government, Bill 1 could not pass through the 
National Assembly unless the government attracted the support of at least one of the 
major opposition parties (i.e. either the PLQ or the CAQ; Québec Solidaire, with only 
two seats, was too small to matter).   This turned out not to be a problem, as Bill 1 
received unanimous support.   
 
Every person and organization appearing before the Standing Committee, and all three 
opposition parties, were at pains to point out that they supported the goal of rooting out 
corruption.  It would have been difficult, politically, for any of the opposition parties to 
oppose the PQ’s signature piece of anti-corruption legislation.  As Sam Hamad, chief 
spokesperson for the Liberals on Bill 1, said in his closing comments to the Commission 
des finances publics, “personne n'est contre l'intégrité” [translation: “nobody’s against 
integrity”].  The Liberals were still under a cloud of corruption and so could not oppose 
it, lest their public image be further tainted.  The CAQ could not oppose it for a different 
reason: they had gone full tilt against Liberal corruption, and had attracted anti-corruption 
crusader Jacques Duchesneau, a former Montreal police chief, as a star candidate.  
Duchesneau was elected for the CAQ in Saint-Jérôme and led the debate on Bill 1 on 
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behalf of the CAQ.  Duchesneau thought there were gaps in Bill 1, and wanted to make it 
stronger, but evidently did not believe that was reason enough to vote against it. 
 
The fact that the PQ had only a minority in the National Assembly also meant that they 
did not control the Standing Committee.  The composition of the National Assembly’s 
standing committees roughly reflects the composition of the assembly.  During the PQ 
government in 2012-14, the Standing Committee had nine members, with four from the 
PQ side, four from the PLQ, and one from the CAQ.
214
  Thus Minister Bédard had to 
receive the support of either the PLQ or the CAQ to adopt any amendment he favoured, 
or to reject any amendment he did not favour.  Even when he did not favour an 
amendment, the two major opposition parties could combine to outvote the government 




Because of the numbers, the Standing Committee debates were real debates, and the 
government had to do a lot more explaining than usual.  For example, on December 3, 
2012, there is a very extended debate between Jacques Duchesneau for the CAQ and 
Minister Bédard on whistleblower protection.  Minister Bédard had to persuade 
Duchesneau to drop his amendment, or get the Liberals to vote with him to defeat it.  (In 
the end, Duchesneau dropped it.)  This kind of extended debate would not happen under a 
majority government.  The governing party would, as quickly as possible, listen to the 
opposition argument, call for a vote, defeat the amendment, and move on to the next 
proposed amendment. 
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In addition to the speeches in the National Assembly itself, the transcripts of the Standing 
Committee run to nearly 400,000 words.  Studying these transcripts is the key to the 




4.3 BILL 1: A SUMMARY OF ITS KEY FEATURES 
 
Minister Bédard, in his opening remarks to the Commission des finances publics, on 
November 12, 2012, identifies the core of Bill 1 this way: 
 
L'habilitation. C'est le coeur du projet de loi, que les entreprises soient 
habilités à traiter avec l'État. 
 
[translation: Pre-authorization.  That’s the heart of the bill, that 
businesses should be pre-authorized when contracting with the state.] 
 
Elsewhere in the same speech, he puts it this way: 
 
…c'est indicateur de notre volonté, nous plaçons l'intégrité au-dessus 
même du processus d'adjudication des contrats. C'est la base, c'est 
l'esprit du projet de loi. Oui, nous devons avoir un bon processus 
d'adjudication, de bons devis en termes techniques, mais, à la base, nous 
devons contracter et chercher à contracter qu'avec des gens qui sont 
honnêtes, qui ont des pratiques honnêtes. 
 
[translation: It’s indicative of our intention, we’re putting integrity 
above even the process of adjudicating contracts.  That’s the foundation, 
that’s the spirit of the bill.  Yes, we have to have a good adjudication 
process, good quotes in technical terms, but, at bottom, we have to 
contract and seek to contract only with people who are honest, who have 
honest practices.] 
 
The explanatory notes to Bill 1, which do not form part of the bill’s official text but 
which are prepared on behalf of the government, summarize the bill this way: 
 
This Act amends the Act respecting contracting by public bodies to 
enhance integrity in public contracts. 
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To that end, it proposes a system under which audits will be conducted to 
ascertain that enterprises wishing to enter into contracts with public 
bodies or municipalities meet the required conditions as regards 
integrity. 
 
To enter into such a contract, an enterprise must first obtain an 
authorization from the Autorité des marchés financiers (the Authority). 
The Authority will examine the integrity of the enterprise and of its 
shareholders, partners, directors or officers and of any person or entity 
that has direct or indirect legal or de facto control over the enterprise. 
 
To ensure that the Authority has all the relevant information it needs to 
make decisions as regards authorizations, it is empowered to mandate 
the Associate Commissioner for Audits appointed under the Anti-
Corruption Act to conduct the audits the Associate Commissioner 
considers necessary. The factors to be considered by the Authority in 
making such decisions are specified in this Act. 
 
An authorization will be valid for a period of three years and is 
renewable. 
 
The scope of the Act respecting contracting by public bodies is 
broadened in order to extend the concept of “public body” to include 
other State entities and thus bring them under that Act. 
 
Other amendments are made for more effective enforcement of the Act 
respecting contracting by public bodies. 
 
All of Bill 1 consists of amendments to existing legislation.  At the time, Quebec already 
had an impressive list of anti-corruption laws.
217
  Part of the backdrop to Bill 1 was the 
idea, shared by both government and opposition, that previous anti-corruption laws had 
been too easy to get around.  The daily drip of news from the Charbonneau Commission 
was evidence enough that corruption in public-sector procurement was, despite the 
statutory framework, still thriving. 
 
The bulk of Bill 1 is amendments to the Loi sur les contrats des organismes publics 
[translation: An Act respecting contracting by public bodies], which take up twenty-two 
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pages of the bill’s thirty-six pages.  These provisions are contained in s 10 of Bill 1, 
which adds Chapter V.2, “Prior Authorization for Public Contract or Public Subcontract”. 
 
Fifteen other statutes are amended.  None of these other amendments is substantive.  
They consist largely of extending the reach of the Act respecting contracting by public 
bodies, for example to reach every municipality (ss 46, 49, 53); and giving officials the 
authority they need to implement the Act, for example by giving the UPAC search 
powers (s 61). 
 
The requirement for pre-authorization is in a new s 21.17: 
 
An enterprise that wishes to enter into a contract with a public body 
involving an expenditure equal to or greater than the amount determined 
by the Government must obtain an authorization for that purpose from 
the Autorité des marchés financiers (the Authority). … 
 
An enterprise that wishes to enter into a subcontract that involves an 
expenditure equal to or greater than that amount and that is directly or 
indirectly related to a contract described in the first paragraph must also 
obtain such an authorization. … 
 
The criteria for pre-authorization are in sections 21.26 and 21.27.  There is a significant 
difference between these two provisions: the former is automatic, the latter is 
discretionary.  Section 21.26 reads as follows: 
 
21.26  The Authority refuses to grant or to renew an authorization, or 
revokes an authorization, if 
 
(1) the enterprise has, in the preceding five years, been found guilty of an 
offence listed in Schedule I; 
 
(2) any of the enterprise’s shareholders holding 50% or more of the 
voting rights attached to the shares that may be exercised under any 
circumstances has, in the preceding five years, been found guilty of an 
offence listed in Schedule I; 
 
(3) any of the enterprise’s directors or officers has, in the preceding five 





(4) the enterprise has, in the preceding five years, been found guilty by a 
foreign court of an offence which, if committed in Canada, could have 
resulted in criminal or penal proceedings for an offence listed in 
Schedule I; 
 
(5) the enterprise has been found guilty of an offence under section 641.2 
of the Act respecting elections and referendums in municipalities 
(chapter E-2.2), section 221.1.2 of the Act respecting school elections 
(chapter E-2.3) or section 564.3 of the Election Act (chapter E-3.3), and 
the prohibition prescribed by that section in connection with the offence 
has not expired, unless a judge has suspended the prohibition; 
 
(6) the enterprise has, in the preceding two years, been ordered to 
suspend work by a decision enforceable under section 7.8 of the Act 
respecting labour relations, vocational training and workforce 
management in the construction industry (chapter R-20); or 
 
(7) the enterprise has, in the preceding two years, been ordered by a 
final judgment to pay an amount claimed under subparagraph c.2 of the 
first paragraph of section 81 of that Act. 
 
A finding of guilty must be disregarded if a pardon has been obtained. 
 
The criteria laid out in s 21.26 for refusal or revocation are objective, or what Minister 
Bédard referred to as “automatismes” [translation: non-discretionary provisions].  
Importantly, they leave the decision-making about whether there has been a conviction 
(paragraphs 1-5) or an order (paragraphs 6 and 7) to the competent authority.  If there is 





In contrast to the automatic nature of s 21.26, s 21.27 is more subjective: 
 
21.27. The Authority may refuse to grant or to renew an authorization or 
may revoke an authorization if the enterprise concerned fails to meet the 
high standards of integrity that the public is entitled to expect from a 
party to a public contract or subcontract.
218
 
      (Emphasis added.) 
 
It is not hard to see the legal questions embedded in this startlingly subjective criterion: 
What is “integrity”?  What are “the high standards of integrity”, and who determines their 
content?  Who is “the public”?  How could we know what the public “is entitled to 
expect”?  None of these is a legal term of art. 
 
The inquiry mandated by s. 21.27 is very broad, as is made clear by the first paragraph of 
s. 21.28: 
 
21.28. For the purposes of section 21.27, the integrity of an enterprise 
and that of its directors, partners, officers and shareholders as well as 
that of other persons or entities that have direct or indirect legal or de 
facto control over the enterprise may be examined. 
 
The government must have known that it was entering difficult waters.  The rest of s. 
21.28 is an attempt to structure the inquiry raised by s. 21.27: 
 
To that end, the Authority may consider such factors as 
 
(1) whether the enterprise or a person or entity referred to in the first 
paragraph maintains connections with a criminal organization within the 
meaning of subsection 1 of section 467.1 of the Criminal Code (Revised 
Statutes of Canada, 1985, chapter C-46) or with any other person or 
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entity that engages in laundering of proceeds of crime or in trafficking in 
a substance included in any of Schedules I to IV to the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (Statutes of Canada, 1996, chapter 19); 
 
(2) whether the enterprise or a person or entity referred to in the first 
paragraph has been prosecuted, in the preceding five years, for any of 
the offences listed in Schedule I; 
 
(3) whether an enterprise, any of its directors, partners, officers or 
shareholders or a person or entity that has direct or indirect legal or de 
facto control over the enterprise has direct or indirect legal or de facto 
control over the enterprise seeking or holding an authorization and was, 
at the time an offence listed in Schedule I was committed by another 
enterprise, a director, partner, officer or shareholder of that other 
enterprise or a person or entity that had direct or indirect legal or de 
facto control over that other enterprise, provided the other enterprise 
was found guilty of the offence in the preceding five years; 
 
(4) whether the enterprise is under the direct or indirect legal or de facto 
control of another enterprise that has, in the preceding five years, been 
found guilty of an offence listed in Schedule I or whether any of the 
directors, partners or officers of that other enterprise or a person or 
entity that had direct or indirect legal or de facto control over that other 
enterprise was under such control at the time the offence was committed; 
 
(5) whether the enterprise or a person or entity referred to in the first 
paragraph has, in the preceding five years, been found guilty of or 
prosecuted for any other criminal or penal offence committed in the 
course of the enterprise’s business; 
 
(6) whether the enterprise or a person or entity referred to in the first 
paragraph has repeatedly evaded or attempted to evade compliance with 
the law in the course of the enterprise’s business; 
 
(7) whether a reasonable person would conclude that the enterprise is 
the extension of another enterprise that would be unable to obtain an 
authorization; 
 
(8) whether a reasonable person would conclude that the enterprise is 
lending its name to another enterprise that would be unable to obtain an 
authorization; 
 
(9) whether the enterprise’s activities are incommensurate with its legal 





(10) whether the enterprise’s structure enables it to evade the 
application of this Act. 
 
For the purposes of section 21.27, the Authority may also consider 
whether a person in authority acting on behalf of the enterprise has, in 
the preceding five years, been found guilty of or prosecuted for an 
offence listed in Schedule I. 
 
A finding of guilty must be disregarded if a pardon has been obtained. 
The facts and circumstances surrounding an offence for which a pardon 
has been obtained may nevertheless be taken into consideration. 
 
For an enterprise that is a public corporation, a person holding 10% or 
more of the voting rights attached to the shares of the enterprise is a 
shareholder. 
 
With these provisions, the Marois government entered into new legislative territory.  
Nobody in Canada had tried anything like this before.  And indeed, there is no obvious 
precedent for it anywhere in the world. 
 
4.4 BILL 1: WHAT WERE THE OBJECTIVES? 
 
The primary objective of Bill 1 was laid out by Minister Bédard in his second reading 
speech to the National Assembly : 
 
Nous avons un objectif qui est clair: ramener la probité en matière de 
contrats publics pour faire en sorte qu'être honnête au Québec, ça doit 
être payant pour tout le monde … 
 
[translation: We have a clear objective: restore probity in public 
contracts, so that being honest is profitable for everybody…] 
 
The most basic element of public procurement—that a public contract should be awarded 
to the bidder submitting the best bid, without fear or favour—was in doubt in Quebec, 





The government was at pains to point out that Bill 1 was only the first part of a broader 
anti-corruption agenda.  Over the course of the debate, Minister Bédard referred many 
times to a “trilogy” of anti-corruption measures.  Bill 1 was the first part of the trilogy, 
with parts two and three still to come.  This is how Minister Bédard explained the trilogy, 
in his second reading speech : 
 
On vise les contrats publics actuellement. Il y aura d'autres phases. Il y 
aura une phase qui va toucher plus à l'interne, comment on s'assure 
aussi qu'au niveau de ceux et celles qui donnent des contrats on ait une 
préoccupation aussi par rapport à cette probité-là. Et la troisième, c'est 
au niveau des règles contractuelles, de revoir l'ensemble des règles 
contractuelles au Québec pour viser à harmoniser ces règles-là, d'avoir 
des bonnes pratiques, d'intégrer les meilleures pratiques et de 
disqualifier les mauvais entrepreneurs sur une base qui est autre que 
celle de la probité mais qui est plutôt des gens qui exécutent mal des 
contrats, qui sont des mauvaises... je vous dirais, des mauvais 
partenaires contractuels. 
 
[translation : …We’re looking at public contracts right now. There will 
be other phases. There will be one phase that deals with more internal 
matters, how do we make sure as well with those who give out contracts 
that we have the same concern about probity. And the third is at the level 
of contractual rules, to review all the contractual rules in Quebec to try 
to harmonise them, to have good practices, to integrate best practices 
and to disqualify bad business people on a basis other than probity, like 





In a different speech, on third reading, Minister Bédard reiterated the trilogy, but stated 




But there was more to Bill 1 than restoring integrity to the public procurement process.  
There was, in particular, another objective, a more political one; and it is this other 
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objective that may explain some of the problems with Bill 1 that will be identified later in 
this chapter. 
 
In the debates on Bill 1, Minister Bédard returns repeatedly to the theme of restoring 
public confidence.  In fact, the “public confidence” objective is written right into the 
statutory objectives of the Act respecting public contracts: 
 
2. Section 2 of the Act [the Act respecting contracting by public bodies] 
is amended by inserting the following subparagraph before 
subparagraph 1 of the first paragraph: 
 
“(0.1) public confidence in the public procurement process by attesting 
to the integrity of tenderers;”. 
 
Section 55 of Bill 1 also amends the Anti-Corruption Act by adding, to the existing 
statutory objectives in that Act, the following words: “and to enhance public confidence 
in the public procurement process.” 
 
It should be pointed out that “re-establish[ing] public confidence” is a significant and 
different objective from restoring integrity.  One can restore integrity to public 
procurement without restoring public confidence (i.e. the system is clean, but the public 
does not believe it).  Equally, one can restore public confidence in public procurement 
without restoring integrity (i.e. the public believes the system is clean, but it is not).  This 
is not to suggest that the objectives of integrity and public confidence are totally 
unrelated to one another.  A system with demonstrable integrity is more likely to win 
public confidence.  But what matters, with respect to public confidence, is whether the 
public believes there is integrity. 
 
4.5  BILL 1: WHAT WERE THE OBJECTIONS? 
 
Everyone, including both major opposition parties and all presenters to the Standing 




surprising, given the context in Quebec at the time.  For example, MNA Hamad, speaking 
for the Quebec Liberal Party, made the following remark at the Standing Committee on 
November 22, 2012: 
 
…tout le monde ici, à l'Assemblée nationale, nous sommes tous pour 
l'intégrité, c'est clair. On est contre la collusion et la corruption et on 
veut adopter la meilleure loi dans les circonstances que nous avons 
aujourd'hui… 
 
[translation: …everybody here, in the National Assembly, we’re all for 
integrity, clearly.  Everybody’s against collusion and corruption and we 
want to adopt the best law for the present circumstances…] 
 
At a different point in the discussion, on December 4, 2012, MNA Hamad makes the 
same point in the opposite way: “personne n'est contre l'intégrité” [translation: “nobody is 
against integrity”].  There was therefore no question that the bill would pass, and pass 
unanimously.  The only question was what the bill would say. 
 
There were four principal objections raised by presenters at the Standing Committee:  
 
 the bill was being pushed too quickly through the National Assembly;  
 the key legal concepts were too subjective;  
 the institutional actors responsible for enforcement did not have the necessary 
resources; and 





A recurring theme, in all of the debate on Bill 1, is the speed at which the government is 





There were only six weeks between the swearing-in of the new government and the 
introduction of Bill 1 to the National Assembly.  The PQ government was elected on 
September 4, 2012; the new ministry was sworn in on September 19, 2012; the National 
Assembly was called into session on October 30, 2012; and Bill 1 was introduced on 
November 1, 2012.   
 
In the course of debate, Minister Bédard refers several times to the long hours put in by 
the drafting team.  His intention is to praise them, but of course it also underlines the tight 
timeframes within which the drafters were working : 
 
Évidemment, je salue les collègues de la commission qui vont me donner 
un bon coup de main là-dessus, le personnel du Conseil du trésor, 
évidemment, qui ont travaillé, depuis notre arrivée, à faire en sorte que 
ce projet de loi corresponde aux attentes de la population. Nous l'avons 
fait avec toute la compétence qu'on peut déployer. Évidemment, je serais 
peut-être un peu mesquin de ne pas mentionner les légistes des autres 
ministères aussi qui ont eu à travailler avec Mme Julie Blackburn qui 
m'accompagne ici, actuellement. Donc, quatre contentieux ont travaillé 
d'arrache-pied pendant un mois et demi pour livrer ce projet de loi, et 




[translation : Of course, I thank the members of the Standing Committee 
who are going to give me a hand [with Bill 1], the staff of the Treasury 
Board, of course, who have worked, since our arrival, so that this bill 
will match the public’s expectations.  We’ve done it with all resources we 
could muster.  Of course I would be remiss not to mention the lawyers 
from other ministries who also worked with Julie Blackburn, who’s here 
with me now.  So four lawyers worked tirelessly for a month and half to 
prepare this bill, and I’m particularly proud of them.] 
 
Minister Bédard stated firmly that the government’s wish was to pass the bill before the 
end of the legislative sitting.  In his brief remarks on first reading, Minister Bédard 
indicates the government’s wish to pass the bill “before Christmas”
222
 (he was speaking 
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in early November).  In his second reading speech, Minister Bédard says, immediately 
after laying out the bill’s objectives, 
 
… et j'espère que les partis d'opposition sentent la même urgence que 
moi quant à réaliser cet objectif. 
 
[translation: …and I hope the opposition parties sense the same urgency 
as I do as far as realizing that objective goes.] 
 
Indeed, in the course of his second reading speech, the minister uses the word “rapidly” 
(or cognates or synonyms) thirteen times.
223
   
 
A number of the presenters at the Standing Committee noted that they had limited time to 
pull together a submission.
224
  One witness, from the Quebec Association of Consulting 
Engineers, cautioned the government against moving too quickly: 
 
Nous comprenons l'empressement du gouvernement à légiférer pour 
assurer l'intégrité des marchés publics. Toutefois, il nous apparaît 
important que le contexte de crise actuel ne pousse pas l'État à mettre 
des entreprises et des emplois à risque sur la seule base de perception 
exacerbée par les révélations entendues quotidiennement devant la 
Commission d'enquête sur l'octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans 
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[translation: We understand the readiness of the government to legislate 
to ensure integrity in public procurement.  Nevertheless, it seems to us 
important that the context of the current crisis not push the government 
to put businesses and jobs at risk on the sole basis of a perception, 
highlighted by the revelations heard daily at the [Charbonneau 
Commission].] 
 
The opposition members also complained, at various times, about the speed at which Bill 
1 was being moved through the legislative process.  Sam Hamad, in his closing 
comments to the Standing Committee, put it this way: 
 
En fait, si on compte le nombre d'amendements, on était rendus à 86 
amendements apportés au projet de loi. C'est la démonstration claire et 
nette que nous avons bonifié le projet de loi et aussi, en même temps, 
c'est la démonstration que le projet de loi, tel qu'il a été présenté, n'était 
pas prêt pour être adopté et pour enrayer la collusion et la corruption. 
 
[translation: In fact, if you count the number of amendments, we got to 
86 amendments to the bill. That’s a very clear demonstration that we 
improved the bill, and at the same time, it’s a demonstration that the bill, 





Jacques Duchesneau, in his closing comments on behalf of the CAQ, expressed the same 
complaint, but in different terms:  
 
Bref, sans que ça soit une critique négative, je trouve que ça s'est fait 
vraiment rapidement. Je comprends les contraintes parlementaires, mais 
disons que chaque article finalement a presque été retouché, et, si on 
avait eu plus de temps, on aurait... en tout cas, dans mon cas... m'aurait 
permis de mieux comprendre. 
 
[translation: In short, without it being a negative criticisim, I think it was 
done really fast. I understand parliamentary constraints, but let’s just 
say that almost every clause has been fixed up, and, if we’d had more 
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The response of Minister Bédard was, in the main, to brush aside complaints about speed 




The core concept in Bill 1 is the concept of “integrity”.  It is in the title of the bill, and it 
is the heart of the authorization provisions: 
 
21.27   The Authority may refuse to grant or to renew an authorization 
or may revoke an authorization if the enterprise concerned fails to meet 
the high standards of integrity that the public is entitled to expect from a 
party to a public contract or subcontract. 
 
As we have seen earlier, in section 2.1 of this thesis, “integrity” is a contested concept.  
Although it has antecedents in law, including Quebec law, it is not well fleshed out as a 
legal term of art.  In the end, it may be no more than the opposite of “corruption”, which 
is itself a contested concept. 
 
The same might be said of the concept of “public confidence”.  One commentator put it 
this way: 
 
La notion de «confiance du public» contenue dans la loi 1 n'est pas un 
critère particulièrement objectif - par opposition à une condamnation 
d'un tribunal, par exemple. 
 
La loi énumère une série de critères pour encadrer ce pouvoir, c'est vrai. 
Par exemple: un actionnaire qui entretient des «liens» avec une 
«organisation criminelle» affecte cette confiance. Si le président va 
échanger des billets avec le parrain, c'est assez facile à régler. Mais on 
peut imaginer mille autres scénarios bien plus ambigus, et dont 
l'entreprise n'a pas connaissance. 
 
Pour plusieurs avocats, ce cadre est flou et potentiellement 
inconstitutionnel en vertu de la théorie de l'imprécision. Une loi doit être 






Dans le climat anticorruption qui existe pour les excellentes raisons 





 [translation: The notion of “public confidence” contained in Bill 1 is 
not a particularly objective criterion—as opposed to a court conviction, 
for example. 
 
The law does set out a series of criteria to give this power a framework.  
For example, a shareholder who has “links” to a “criminal 
organization” affects this confidence.  If the CEO wants to exchange 
notes with the godfather, it’s easy to sort out.  But you can imagine a 
thousand other, more ambiguous scenarios, and of which the business 
isn’t aware. 
 
For several lawyers, this framework is fuzzy and potentially 
unconstitutional because of its imprecision.  A law has to be sufficiently 
clear, an administrative power sufficiently mapped out, to be valid. 
 
In the anti-corruption climate that currently exists, for very good reason, 
no parliamentarian seems to have raised this problem.] 
 
A witness at the Standing Committee, speaking on behalf of the Quebec Association of 
Consulting Engineers, put it this way: 
 
Une loi efficace … doit reposer sur des notions claires et objectives. 
Malgré notre accord avec l'esprit du projet de loi n° 1, certains éléments 
du projet de loi tel que présenté nous semblent difficiles à appliquer et 
sujets à interprétation. Par exemple, l'article [21.27] mentionne que 
l'autorité pourra … refuser d'accorder une autorisation si elle considère 
que la confiance du public est affectée en raison du manque d'intégrité 
de l'entreprise. Cette notion de confiance du public, prise seule, sans 
description de critères objectifs permettant à l'AMF et aux entreprises 
d'identifier les comportements traduisant un tel manque d'intégrité, peut 
donner lieu à un large éventail d'interprétations susceptibles de 
provoquer des erreurs et éventuellement une multiplication des 
contestations judiciaires. 
 
Compte tenu des conséquences importantes que peut avoir sur une 
entreprise le retrait du privilège de contracter avec l'État, il nous 
apparaît souhaitable d'éviter qu'un tel retrait résulte de l'utilisation de 
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notions subjectives. Entre autres, les notions de contrôle de facto, 
comportement répréhensible, personne raisonnable et de perception, qui 





[translation: An effective law … has to be based on clear, objective 
ideas.  Despite our agreement with the spirit of Bill 1, certain aspects of 
the bill as presented seem difficult to apply and subject to interpretation.  
For example, section [21.27] says the Authority can … refuse to grant an 
authorization if it believes public confidence is affected because of the 
company’s lack of integrity.  This idea of public confidence, by itself, 
without objective criteria that would allow the AMF and companies to 
identify the behaviours demonstrating this lack of integrtiy, could lead to 
a wide range of interpretations that are likely to lead to errors and 
eventually to a multiplicity of judicial reviews. 
 
[Given the heavy consequences for a company if its privilege of 
contracting with the government is removed, it seems to us desirable to 
avoid a situation where that removal results from the use of subjective 
ideas.  Among other things, the ideas of control de facto, reprehensible 
conduct, reasonable person and perception, that are supposed to guide 




In his closing comments to the Standing Committee, Jacques Duchesneau for the CAQ 
refers to “des standards ambigus” [translation: “ambiguous standards”]. 
 
In reply, Minister Bédard states that the discretionary nature of the provisions is an 
important element of the law.  He draws a distinction between “discretionary” and 
“arbitrary”, and asserts that Bill 1 falls on the right side of the line: 
 
Donc, ne doutons pas que cette discrétion qu'on donne doit être 
encadrée, doit avoir des critères d'évaluation, mais elle demeurera à la 
base discrétionnaire, pas arbitraire. La différence entre l'arbitraire puis 
le discrétionnaire, c'est que la discrétion peut être encadrée. 
L'arbitraire, c'est de décider à partir de ce qu'on pense, dans la vie, ce 
qui est le meilleur, là, ou ce qui est le moins bon, peu importe. Nous ne 
sommes pas dans l'arbitraire. Donc, il y a des automatismes prévus à la 
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loi et il y aura en même temps certaines modifications pour encadrer les 
décisions discrétionnaires de l'Autorité des marchés financiers et en 




[translation: We can be sure that this discretion that we’re given must be 
structured, must have criteria, but at its root it remains discretionary, not 
arbitrary.  The difference between “arbitrary” and “discretionary” is 
that discretion can be structured. 
 
[To be arbitrary means to decide according to what you think, in life, 
what’s the best, or what’s less good, it doesn’t matter.  We’re not in the 
arbitrary.  There are non-discretionary provisions in the law, and at the 
same time there will be amendments to structure the discretionary 
decisions of the AMF and also the advice given by the UPAC.] 
 
In other words, Minister Bédard equated subjectivity and discretion, and was of the view 
that enough structure was being supplied to the discretionary provisions to reduce 
concerns about too much subjectivity.  As we will see shortly, in section 4.5.4, Minister 
Bédard believed the discretion would enable Bill 1 to succeed where other anti-corruption 
laws had failed. 
 
4.5.3 Institutional Capacity 
 
Another set of objections concerned whether the institutions charged with making pre-
authorization work—principally the AMF and the UPAC—had the resources to carry out 
their new statutory responsibilities. 
 
Pre-authorization for public-sector procurement contracts is a new responsibility for the 
AMF, and indeed, new in Canada for securities commissions.  Nevertheless, Minister 
Bédard believes the AMF is the right choice: 
 
Ce qu'on a constaté, c'est que les choix qu'on a faits, pour l'organisation, 
tout d'abord, qui a à avoir la responsabilité de l'habilitation, ça a été un 
choix qui était réfléchi et qui nous a permis de conclure que l'AMF était 
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l'autorité toute choisie pour donner ces habilitations. Et, l'ensemble des 
consultations, peu de gens ont remis en cause ce choix-là. Au contraire, 
ils nous ont appuyés par rapport à l'organisation choisie, son 





[translation: What people realized is that the choices we made, for the 
organization that would have the responsibility for authorization, was a 
considered choice and that we concluded the AMF was the right body to 
give the authorizations.  And in all the consultations, few people 
questioned that choice.  To the contrary, they supported us in our choice 
of organization, its independence, its skills, the powers it currently 
holds.] 
 
Minister Bédard notes that other organisms were considered for the pre-authorization 
role: 
 
Il y a une réflexion aussi, des fois, qui a précédé certains choix -- et j'en 
ai parlé au député de Louis-Hébert -- par exemple, pourquoi on exclut la 
Régie du bâtiment, pourquoi on s'est tournés vers l'AMF, pourquoi on a 
exclu l'Agence du revenu. Ce n'est pas qu'on n'y a pas pensé. Au 
contraire, ça faisait partie des éléments qu'on a identifiés dès le départ, 
qu'on a... et sur lesquels on a mis des critères sur lesquels on voulait 
aboutir: d'efficience de la loi, de rapidité en termes d'application, 
d'indépendance, de structure, de mandat. Tout ça a été évalué case par 
case. Et on s'est dit: Bon, ça, non; ça, oui. 
 
Même le Commissaire au lobbyisme a été évalué -- seulement pour vous 
dire -- le Vérificateur général. Alors, on a passé au crible tout ce qui 
avait de l'indépendance ou était capable de relever ce défi qu'on pose 
aujourd'hui aux organisations étatiques, de faire en sorte que ces 
habilitations puissent se donner le plus rapidement possible. Donc, le 
choix s'est porté sur l'efficience, avec un caractère d'indépendance clair 
et un mandat qui était lié à la fonction que... ou à la responsabilité qu'on 
lui donnait, donc de ne pas partir à zéro avec une organisation, bien 




[translation:] There was a thought process, sometimes, that preceded 
certain choices—and I’ve talked about it with the member for Louis–
Hébert—for example, why we excluded the Building Authority, why we 
turned to the AMF, why we excluded the Revenue Agency.  It’s not 








because we didn’t think about it.  On the contrary, that was among the 
elements we identified from the start, that we…and on which we put 
criteria on which we wanted to end up : efficiency of the law, speed of 
application, independence, structure, authority.  All of that was looked at 
case by case.  And we said to ourselves : Okay, this one, yes ; that one, 
no. 
 
Even the Lobbyist Commissioner was looked at—just to let you know—
the Auditor General.  So we sifted through everybody that was 
independent or that was capable of meeting the challenge that we’re 
putting to the public entities, to get these pre-authorizations done as 
quickly as possible.  So the choice was made based on efficiency, with 
clear independence, and a mandate linked to the function that…or to the 
responsibility we were giving it, so not to start from scratch with an 
organization, even if it already existed.  It had to have the teams in place 
already. 
 
In the end, the AMF and the UPAC were selected because it was already well-equipped 
to carry out the task of pre-authorization: 
 
Et l'AMF rencontrait ces conditions. C'est des centaines de personnes. 
C'est un contentieux très fort. C'est un lien avec les services policiers qui 
existe déjà parce qu'ils font de l'habilitation au niveau des services 
monétaires. Donc, ils connaissent cette réalité. L'organisation a, je 
pense, une autorité dans la population et une confiance qui est réelle. 
Elle s'est bâtie cette confiance suite aux réactions qu'elle a eues par 
rapport à de grands scandales financiers qu'on connaît. Elle a réussi, au 
contraire, à renforcer son organisation, et personne ne doute de cette 





[translation: And the AMF met those condition.  It’s hundreds of people.  
It’s a strong litigation department.  It’s an existing link with police forces 
because it’s doing authorization for financial services.  So, it knows that 
reality.  The organization has, I think, an authority among the population 
and a confidence which is real.  It built that confidence following its 
reaction to the big financial scandals that we saw.  In fact it succeeded in 
reinforcing its organization, and nobody questions that organization 
now.  Same thing for the UPAC, Madame Speaker.] 
 






It is mentioned at the beginning of the November 12th session of the Standing 
Committee, and Sam Hamad mentions again on November 13th, that the three principal 
agencies whose responsibilities are enlarged by Bill 1—namely the UPAC, the AMF, and 
the RBQ—have all declined to appear before the Standing Committee, but that all have 
said they were consulted on the drafting of Bill 1.  Hamad asks that their advice be tabled 
with the committee.  Minister Bédard replies: 
 
Bien, écoutez, là, entendons les gens, là. Les lettres ont été déposées, 
effectivement, par les différents groupes. Vous avez vu, les trois groupes 
ont déposé les lettres en question. Je n'ai pas d'avis en soi. On a eu des 





[translation: Mr. Bédard : Well, listen, let’s hear the people.  The letters 
were tabled, really, by the different groups.  You’ve seen, the three 
groups have tabled the letters in question.  I don’t have advice as such.  
We had discussions, simply to make sure the law could be 
operationalized.  So that’s it.] 
 
This complaint of the opposition, that the AMF (and other government entities implicated 
in Bill 1) should have been heard by the Standing Committee, is expressed several 
times.
235
  The purpose of hearing from them was to probe whether they had the ability to 
carry out the mandate confided to them by Bill 1. 
 
The opposition were not the only ones who worried about the AMF’s institutional 
capacity.  André Bergeron of the Corporation des maîtres mécaniciens en tuyauterie du 
Québec (CMMTQ) [translation: Association of Master Pipe Mechanics of Quebec
236
], in 
his presentation to the Standing Committee on November 13, 2012, put it this way: 
 
Sur un plan plus général, il est évident que le projet de loi confère à 
l'AMF une large discrétion puisqu'elle peut refuser à une entreprise 
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l'autorisation requise, si elle considère que la confiance du public est 
affectée en raison du manque d'intégrité de l'entreprise ou de l'un de ses 
administrateurs ou dirigeants. Nous nous questionnons sur l'à-propos 
d'une telle discrétion qui peut ouvrir la porte à l'arbitraire. La réponse 
n'est pas simple, et nous laisserons le soin aux juristes d'en débattre. 
 
La CMMTQ insiste cependant sur le fait que l'AMF devra développer 
l'expertise nécessaire pour exercer judicieusement ce pouvoir 
discrétionnaire et, du même souffle, demande au gouvernement de lui 
donner les ressources nécessaires pour ce faire. Les situations qui 
devront être évaluées feront appel à des compétences complètement 
différentes de celles qui relèvent présentement de l'AMF. Pour nous, le 
véhicule utilisé pour délivrer les autorisations de contracter avec l'État 
importe moins que la façon dont les demandes seront traitées. 
 
[translation: On a more general level, it’s clear that the bill confers on 
the AMF a large discretion, because it can refuse a company the 
required authorization, if it believes that public confidence is affected 
because of the lack of integrity of one of its managers or directors.  We 
question the appropriateness of such a discretion, which can open the 
door to arbitrariness.  The answer isn’t simple, and we’ll leave that 
debate to the lawyers. 
 
[Nevertheless, the CMMTQ insists on the fact that the AMF has to 
develop the expertise necessary to exercise this discretionary power 
judiciously and, at the same time, asks the government to give it the 
necessary resources.  The situations that will have to be assessed will 
call for skills completely different from those the AMF currently has.  
For us, the vehicle used to deliver the authorizations for contracting with 
the government are less important than the way in which those 
applications will be treated.] 
 
In a speech given in May 2013, the AMF official leading the pre-authorization initiative, 
Eric Stevenson, admitted that the AMF was, when the new law entered into force, barely 
ready to meet its new responsibilities.
237
  At the time, it was estimated that the $40 
million threshold would require 250 companies to be cleared, and the number would rise 
to 700 when the threshold was lowered to $10 million. 
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At a colloquium organized in May 2014 by the Conseil du patronat du Québec 
[translation: Quebec Business Council], the key civil servant at the Treasury Board, Julie 
Blackburn, estimated that the November 2013 reduction in the threshold to $10 million 
(from the original $40 million) would affect 400 companies, and that a further reduction 
to $5 million (“prochainement” [translation: shortly)] would affect 850 companies.
238
  
Since the law applies to major shareholders, all members of the board, all senior 
executives, the number of verifications quickly rises to the many thousands.  Ms 
Blackburn is quoted as stating that the eventual goal was to lower the threshold to 
$100,000, perhaps within three to four years, but that the decision whether to do so, and 
when, belonged at the political level.  These remarks were made shortly after the change 
of government in Quebec in 2014, as the Marois government was defeated and the 




The fourth objection to Bill 1 was perhaps the most significant and yet it received the 
least attention in the overall examination of the bill.  It was often expressed more as a 
question than an assertion: will it work? 
 
The minister wants the pre-authorization process to work: 
 
… ce que je veux m'assurer, c'est que l'effet désiré n'ait pas l'effet pervers 
de faire en sorte d'engager beaucoup de ressources pour pas de résultat, 
donc. Et c'est notre objectif, et c'est pour ça qu'on s'est gardé une grande 
base discrétionnaire par l'article 21.25, 21.26, pour permettre de 
travailler vraiment auprès de ceux et celles qui... je vous dirais, pour qui 
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l'habilitation est une véritable défi en soi, donc, et c'est pour ça... C'est 




[translation: …what I want to be sure of, is that the desired impact 
doesn’t have the perverse effect of committing a lot of resources for no 
purpose.  And that’s our goal, and that’s why we kept a lot of discretion 
with section 21.25, 21.26, to allow ourselves to really work with those 
who … I should say, so that pre-authorization is a real challenge in 
itself, and that’s why … There’s a concentration of resources.] 
 
At the same time, Minister Bédard seems aware that the authorization process, in itself, 
may weed out very few people or companies: 
 
Nous sommes conscients que la plupart des organismes... plutôt, des 
compagnies, sociétés, machin, vont passer les tests d'habilitation, et on 




[translation: We’re aware that most entities … rather, companies, 
corporations, whatever, will pass the pre-authorization test, and in the 
end that all of them will be able to.] 
 
Another recurring theme in Minister Bédard’s speeches in the National Assembly, and 
interventions in Standing Committee, is the government’s desire to have the law obeyed, 
and to avoid the problem of having people do an end-run around the laws.  Minister 
Bédard asserts that the existing set of anti-corruption laws has been ineffective.  
Nevertheless, his analysis of why existing legislation failed to stem corruption is not 
extensive, and is captured in this passage from his second-reading speech : 
 
…je pense que je ne surprendrai personne en disant que nous allons 
conserver l'esprit du projet de loi, qui est celui de garder une latitude à 
ceux et celles qui vont émettre l'habilitation. Nous ne nous enfermerons 
pas dans des automatismes qui donnent en même temps la voie de sortie 
ou la voie de contournement de ceux et celles qui ne veulent pas se 
soumettre à la loi. Et ça a été l'erreur, d'ailleurs, des dernières 
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législations. On donnait le mode d'emploi très facile, très simple à ceux 
et celles qui veulent contourner la loi. Et ils l'ont fait allègrement, 
d'ailleurs, avec des procédés on ne peut plus simples: créer une 
compagnie à côté puis avoir le même contrat. Donc, c'en était presque 
ridicule. Et c'est ce qui fait que notre action, à ce moment-là, se 




[translation: …I don’t think I’ll surprise anyone by saying that we’re 
going to maintain the essence of the law, which is to keep a certain 
latitude for those who will grant the pre-authorization.  We won’t box 
ourselves in with automatic provisions, which at the same time gives a 
path to avoid or do an end-run around the law to those who don’t want 
to obey the law.  Because that was the mitake of previous legislation.  
They gave a simple, easy method to those who wanted to do an end-run 
around the law.  And they did it happily, taking steps that could not have 
been simpler: create a side-company then win the same contract.  It was 
almost ridiculous.  And that’s why our action, back then, lost credibility 
among the population.] 
 
This hardly amounts to a deep analysis of why Bill 1 is likely to succeed.  The Liberal 
opposition, no doubt anxious to defend its record in office, wanted to see Bill 1 more as a 
continuity in the anti-corruption fight, rather than a different direction.
242
  Their 
spokesperson, former minister Sam Hamad, noted “very humbly” that it was wrong to 




There is only one MNA who persistently raised questions about whether the bill would 
actually work: Jacques Duchesneau, MNA for Saint-Jérôme and spokesperson on Bill 1 
for the CAQ.  Duchesneau’s objections are grounded in his career as a police officer and 
anti-corruption investigator.   
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 Ibid: “…il est faux de penser, je pense, très humblement, qu'une loi va régler tous les 
problèmes.” [Translation: “…it is wrong to believe, I think, very humbly, that a statute 





Duchesneau’s basic objection was that it was not clear that Bill 1 was getting to the root 
of the problem.  In his second reading speech, on November 20, 2012, he says: 
 
La grande question qu'on doit se poser: Est-ce que ce nouveau processus 
va venir régler le problème? Malheureusement, je ne partage pas 
l'optimisme du président du Conseil du trésor quant à la façon de voir le 
projet de loi n° 1, qui est un élément pour s'attaquer au problème, mais 




[translation: The big question that we have to ask: Is this new process 
going to solve the problem?  Unfortunately, I don’t share the optimism of 
the Treasury Board chair in terms of how to see Bill 1, which is an 
element in attacking the problem [of corruption], but definitely not a 
panacea for the situation.] 
 
He points out that the bill does not contain any “diagnosis” of the corruption problem, 
and therefore it does not answer the question of how bad governance became so 
engrained in the awarding of contracts.
245
   
 
In his closing remarks to the Standing Committee, on December 4, 2012, Duchesneau 
says: 
 
Il y avait aussi peu de mesures, dans le projet de loi tel qu'il est 
actuellement, même une fois les amendements adoptés, qui permettraient 
de détecter de la collusion ou de la fraude. 
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[translation: There were few measures, in the bill as it is presently, even 
as amended, that would permit detection of collusion and fraud.] 
 
Duchesneau also returned several times to the need for greater whistleblower protection: 
 
Vous m'avez entendu maintes et maintes fois parler de la protection des 
dénonciateurs. C'est une chose à laquelle je crois. Quiconque a déjà 
enquêté sur des activités criminelles le sait, la vérité est souvent révélée 
par des individus qui ont vu de près ce qui s'est passé ou même participé 
à des activités illégales.
246
   
 
[translation: You’ve heard me over and over again talk about 
whistleblower protection.  It’s something I believe in.  Anyone with 
experience investigating criminal activity knows that the truth is often 
revealed by individuals who saw up close what happened or even 
participated in criminal activity.] 
 
Duchesneau also notes that the government has not been able to state in any detail what 
the next steps of the “trilogy” will be.  He wonders how one can judge if Bill 1 is a good 
law, if it’s not known how it will fit with the other laws. 
 
4.6 BILL 1: WAS IT EVIDENCE-BASED LAW-MAKING? 
Chapter 3 concluded with the following questions, derived from our study of the concept 
of corruption (Chapter 2), existing national and international anti-corruption instruments 
(Chapter 3), and the anti-corruption literature (Chapter 4): 
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 Definition of the problem: What is the nature of the corruption in Quebec’s public 
procurement? 
 Outline of the legal context: What is the existing legal context (international and 
national anti-corruption instruments) for corruption in public-sector procurement, 
and how does a new law fit in that context? 
 Survey of the literature: What guidance is provided by the existing academic and 
non-academic literature on fighting corruption in public-sector procurement? 
 Survey of practical experience: What guidance is provided by practical experience 
in fighting corruption in other jurisdictions, such as the World Bank, the OECD, 
the EU, and New York City? 
 Evaluation of effectiveness: Assuming the approach embodied in Bill 1 is 
supported by context, the literature, and experience, how will the operation of the 
new law be monitored, and how will success be measured?  
 
These are the questions that we would expect to be addressed in Quebec’s lawmaking 
process, if it were evidence-based.  We now turn to an examination of the extent to which 
each was addressed. 
 
 
4.6.1 Definition of the problem 
 
Quebec’s lawmakers did not spend much time defining the nature of the corruption that 
they are tackling with Bill 1.  They seem to take it for granted that there is a common 
understanding of the problem, based on reports in the media and from the Charbonneau 
Commission. 
 
Fairly typical would be this passage from Minister Bédard’s second reading speech: 
 
…on fait en sorte que les Québécois, oui, vont reprendre confiance dans 
leurs institutions, mais en même temps on va s'assurer que les Québécois 
paient pour leurs travaux les bons coûts, qu'ils s'assurent que les travaux 
soient faits dans des situations contractuelles qui sont acceptables. Et ce 




briser cette confiance, d'où la réponse du gouvernement, je pense, qui est 




[translation: …we’re doing it in a way that, yes, Quebecers will regain 
confidence in their institutions, but at the same time we want to reassure 
them they’re paying the right price for their public works, that the public 
works are being done on acceptable contractual terms.  And what we’re 
seeing right now at the Charbonneau Commission is enough to break 
that confidence, and thus the government’s response which is, I think, in 
line with the public’s expectations.] 
 
In this passage we see Minister Bédard sum up the mischief to be remedied as “what 
we’re seeing right now at the Charbonneau Commission.”  
 
As we saw in section 2.1.2 of this thesis, corruption in public-sector procurement can 
take many forms, and can occur at any stage of the project process, including project 
identification, planning, financing, design, tender, execution, operation and maintenance.  
Different kinds of corruption would call for different kinds of remedies.  Yet the Bill 1 
debate is devoid of any real diagnosis of why or where the corruption is occurring. 
 
We might at least have expected that there would be some analysis of how Bill 1’s pre-
authorization mechanism, if it had been in place previously, would have prevented the 
corruption that was being targetted.  Yet nowhere, in all the voluminous debates on Bill 
1, does Minister Bédard attempt to justify Bill 1 in these terms. 
 
4.6.2 Outline of the legal context 
 
One of the most surprising results of my research is that, in the volumnious debates 
around Bill 1, there is not a single mention of any of the international and national anti-
corruption instruments, apart from the Criminal Code of Canada.   
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There is no mention of the UNCAC, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the CFPA, or 
the CFPOA.  It is as if Quebec’s MNAs, including Bill 1’s sponsoring minister, are not 
aware of their existence. 
 
As we saw in section 3.3.1.4 of this thesis, the EU, one of the leading jurisdictions in the 
world when it comes to fighting corruption in public-sector procurement, has recently 
come to the conclusion that the fight will not be advanced with more legislation.  The 
existing legislative instruments, says the EU, are enough.  The focus now is on 
enforcement.  Although there are few jurisdictions in the world as advanced as the EU, 
the EU’s stance is a useful reminder that one question lawmakers should ask themselves, 
before undertaking more legislation, whether legislation is, in fact, the best way forward.  
 
There is more awareness on the part of MNAs, and more discussion, of Quebec’s existing 
anti-corruption legislation.  Indeed, the Standing Committee debates include many 
examples of MNAs discussing how Bill 1 fits within existing provincial law.   
 
But if existing law was not working, or not working as intended, one might have 
expected someone to ask: if the existing legislation isn’t working, why is more legislation 
the answer?  In all of the National Assembly debate on Bill 1, this question is not raised 
by anyone. 
 
4.6.3 Survey of the literature 
 
Just as there is no mention of the international and national anti-corruption instruments, 
there is not a single reference in any of the National Assembly debates to any of the vast 
anti-corruption literature, whether academic or non-academic.  Neither is there any 
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It is possible that experts were consulted, and the literature surveyed; the point is that 
there is no evidence of it in the transcripts. 
 
The procedure of the National Assembly does not encourage the presentation of expert 
evidence.  The National Assembly, like every other Westminster parliament, does not 
itself hear from expert witnesses.  The Standing Committee on Public Finance is open to 
any citizen (including expert) who wishes to come forward, but it does not proactively 
seek expert evidence to comment on bills.  The Standing Committee did receive eighteen 
formal submissions, but almost all were from Quebec-based professional associations.  
One was from an expert on Quebec contract law, who appeared on his own initiative.  
None was from an expert on corruption. 
 
4.6.4 Survey of practical experience 
 
There is no specific reference, in any of the transcripts, to anti-corruption precedents 
anywhere else in the world.   
 
The closest reference to reliance on precedent is the following quotation from Minister 
Bédard, at the opening of the public consultations by the Commission des finances 
publics on November 12, 2012: 
 
Cette approche est nouvelle. Elle s'est inspirée de certaines autres 
législations à travers le monde, mais je vous dirais qu'on a fait beaucoup 
de débroussaillage dans cette façon de faire, et elle se caractérise par le 
fait que nous souhaitons agir en amont, donc, au départ, de créer cette 
habilitation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
authorities, economic operators, lawyers, non-governmental organisations and experts 
such as academics and practitioners on the operation of and possible improvements 
to the Remedies Directives”: Liisa Koskinen, “Reform of Public Procurement Remedies: 
A First Look at the Commission Proposal for an Amending Directive”, 2006/3 




[translation: This approach is new.  It was inspired by certain other laws 
around the world, but I would say to you that we’ve done a lot of 
simplifying (literally, “brush-clearing”) in this way of doing things, and 
it’s characterized by the fact we want to be pro-active, at the beginning, 
in creating this pre-authorization.] 
 
On May 27, 2014, I wrote to the Treasury Board in Quebec, quoting this passage, and 





On June 2, 2014, I received a reply from the communications branch of the Treasury 
Board secretariat.  Omitting formalities, the answer was brief: 
 
Nous aurions aimé être en mesure de vous aider, d’autant plus que votre 
sujet de maîtrise est en lien avec la Loi sur l’intégrité en matière de 
contrats publics. Malheureusement, après vérification, nous ne 




[translation: We would have liked to be able to help you, especially 
because the subject of your master’s is connected to the Act respecting 
integrity in public contracts.  Unfortunately, after checking, we do not 
have that information.] 
 
The only other possible reference to precedent that I could find is the following passage, 
also from Minister Bédard and also from the Standing Committee, but this time from the 
opening of the clause-by-clause working sessions, on November 22, 2012: 
 
Mais, à ce moment-ci, vous me permettrez de rappeler les principes qui 
nous guident dans le cadre de ce projet de loi: de ramener l'intégrité 
dans l'octroi des contrats publics, de rétablir la confiance du public, de 
punir les contrevenants et dissuader les malhonnêtes et encourager les 
bonnes pratiques et surtout, à ce moment-là, récompenser l'honnêteté. 
Tel est notre objectif, qui est une nouvelle approche, vous le savez, M. le 
Président, qui est celle de l'habilitation, qui a fait ses preuves. Et on a 
constaté, effectivement, que ça avait reçu un accueil presque unanime 
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auprès de ceux et celles qui sont venus nous voir. Donc, cette approche 




[translation: Now you will permit me to recall the principles that are 
guiding us in the context of this bill: to restore integrity in the awarding 
of public contracts, to re-establish public confidence, to punish 
wrongdoers and dissuade the dishonest and encourage good practices 
and especially, right now, to reward honesty.  That’s our objective, 
which is a new approach, you know, Mr. Chair, which is pre-
authorization, which is a proven approach.  And everyone realizes, 
actually, that it has received almost unanimous support among those 
who came to see us.  So that approach is, in our opinion, the right one.] 
 
 (Emphasis added) 
 
In the underlined passage, the minister claims that pre-authorization is “a proven 
approach,” but he does not say then, nor anywhere else in the transcripts, where it has 
been proven.  No member of the opposition asks. 
 
With respect to New York City,
252
 the transcripts contain only one minor, indirect 
reference.  It comes not from Minister Bédard or any of the other MNAs, but from the 
testimony to the Standing Committee by Pierre Hamel of the Association de la 
construction du Québec [translation: Quebec Construction Association].  In answer to a 
question from MNA Sam Hamad about whether Mr. Hamel believes the Régie du 
bâtiment is absent from Bill1, Mr. Hamel replies as follows: 
 
Absolument pas... bien, c'est-à-dire que oui et non. C'est-à-dire 
qu'essentiellement le projet de loi n° 73 et le projet de loi n° 35 ont fait 
en sorte de mettre les règles beaucoup plus sévères au niveau des 
entrepreneurs. Et les entrepreneurs avaient à la fois le régime du RENA 
et le régime des licences restreintes. Et 35 a rendu les amendes encore 
plus sévères, etc., faisant en sorte que, depuis 2009 ou 2010 -- c'était à la 
fin 2009 -- on a un... voyons, un formulaire de demande de licence dans 
lequel on doit déclarer les antécédents judiciaires au niveau de 
l'actionnaire, de l'administrateur, du dirigeant et des prêteurs. Et on 
doit, pour tous ces gens-là, déterminer les infractions fiscales, les 
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infractions pénales aux différentes lois comme telles, un formulaire qui 
est en annexe, qui a 22 pages et qui est pratiquement la même chose que 
ce qui est demandé par la ville de New York pour la vérification. 
 
Alors donc, essentiellement, la Régie du bâtiment, pour l'industrie de la 
construction, c'est l'organisme qui, déjà, détermine ces éléments-là. Ce 
que fait le projet de loi, c'est que ces demandes-là, ces vérifications-là 
s'étendent à tous les fournisseurs de l'État. Mais l'industrie de la 




[translation: Absolutely not… actually, yes and no.  That is to say that 
essentially Bills 73 and 35 had the effect of putting in place rules that 
were much more severe for business owners.  And business owners had 
at the same time the RENA regime and the regime of limited licenses.  
And 35 made fines heavier, etc., so that since 2009 or 2010—it was the 
end of 2009—we had a… a license application form in which we had to 
declare any judicial proceedings for the shareholder, management, 
directors, and lenders.  And we had to, for all these people, figure out 
any tax violations, penal violations of all these different laws, a form 
with an appendix, that had 22 pages and which is practically the same as 
what New York City was asking for verification. 
 
[So essentially, the RBQ, for the construction industry, was the body that 
already was looking at those things.  What the bill does, is it takes those 
questions, those verifications, and extends them to all public-sector 
contractors.  But in the construction industry, we were already pretty 
much headed in that direction.] 
 
In 2014, the Charbonneau Commission invited two witnesses from New York City to 
speak, in detail, about corruption in that city’s construction industry, and the efforts made 
to fight it.  One had been the commissioner of the Department of Investigations for ten 
years, ending in 2013.
254
  In their testimony, neither mentions having been consulted by 
the Quebec government in 2012 as Bill 1 was being prepared.
255
  One of the witnesses, 
Toby Thacher, emphasized in his testimony that the system of pre-authorization is only 
one small component of a much broader anti-corruption system, and that it could not 
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work on its own, and indeed might on its own have the perverse effect of increasing costs 
by reducing the pool of eligible bidders.  It seems unlikely, then, that New York City was 
consulted as Bill 1 was being developed, since Bill 1 does exactly what Mr. Thacher says 
will not work as a stand-alone measure. 
 
We are left to wonder whether the PQ government did, in fact, have a model or models 
from which it was copying.  Because there is little or no explicit reference in the 
transcripts to anti-corruption efforts elsewhere, the government could not meet opposition 
objections with the reassurance that the pre-authorization system embodied in Bill 1 was 
proven to have worked elsewhere.  On the one occasion when Minister Bédard did make 
that claim, he did not say where he was referring to, and nobody in the opposition asked. 
 
4.6.5 Evaluation of effectiveness 
 
As we have seen, some opposition MNAs and Standing Committee presenters questioned 
the institutional capacity of the AMF to carry out the mandate confided to it by Bill 1.  
The AMF did not appear before the committee, apparently at the government’s direction.  
Consequently, members of the Standing Committee had to accept Minister Bédard’s 
assurances that the AMF had the necessary capacity. 
 
Although Bill 1 calls for the preparation of an annual report from the AMF on its 
operations under Bill 1, the report is to be delivered to the Treasury Board.  It is not clear 
that the report will be made public.  On November 28, 2012, at the Standing Committee, 
MNA Gautrin sparred with Minister Bédard over s. 28 of Bill 1, adding a new s. 43.2 to 
the Loi sur l’autorité des marchés financiers [translation : Financial Markets Authority 
Act] to require that an annual report be delivered by the AMF to the Treasury Board.  
MNA Gautrin wanted the report to be tabled in the National Assembly.  Minister Bédard 





4.7 SUBSEQUENT EVENTS 
Following the adoption of Bill 1, there were media reports of management shuffling 
within the construction industry, apparently in response to Bill 1.
256
  Other media reports 
included the following: 
 
 A former executive of an urban planning company was convicted under Quebec 
election law, but that the Director-General of Elections withdrew charges against 
the company itself.  The company can therefore continue to bid on public 
contracts.
257
   
 Dessau, a large consulting engineering firm, was blacklisted by the City of 
Montreal after admitting it had engaged in corrupt practices.  This led to criticism 
that co-operating companies like Dessau were being punished, while those who 
maintained silence were being rewarded for their silence.
258
 





Two large engineering firms, SNC-Lavalin and WSP Global (formerly Genivar), received 
their integrity authorizations on February 5, 2014.
260
  Both firms had figured in the 
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testimony before the Charbonneau Commission.  SNC-Lavalin, which was also 
implicated in corruption scandals in Bangladesh and Libya, had been debarred by the 
World Bank for ten years.
261
  This case illustrates well a key difference between the Bill 
1 model and the World Bank model.  Under the Bill 1 model, it did not take long for 
SNC-Lavalin to get its pre-authorization.  Meanwhile, the World Bank process introduces 
an element of punishment and  deterrence. 
 
The provincial government, in co-operation with the City of Montreal, enacted a law 
creating the post of Inspector General.
262
  The first Inspector-General, Denis Gallant, was 
hired away from the Charbonneau Commission, where he was one of the commission 
counsel.  There were some criticisms that the law governing the Inspector General was 
not strong enough. 
 
In the political arena, there have been calls for the dollar limit in Bill 1 to be lowered for 





In drafting Bill 1, the Marois government received no guidance from the Charbonneau 
Commission.  The original deadline for the Charbonneau Commission’s report was 
October 19, 2013.  The Marois government could perhaps have waited for the 
commission’s report, in order to ensure that its reforms were in keeping with the 
commission’s findings and recommendations.  During the debates on Bill 1, Minister 
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Bédard had indicated the government’s view was that there was no need to wait.
264
  Well 
after Bill 1 was passed and began operations, the Commission continued to receive 




Although the 2013 Order in Council extending the Commission’s deadline asked for an 
outline, in the interim report, of possible solutions to the problem of corruption, the 
Commission judged that it was premature, and declined to do so.
266
  In its interim report, 
issued in January 2014, the Commission gave few hints about the solutions it would 
propose, saying it was premature even to try.
267
  In a phrase that could well be taken as a 
critique of the government’s approach, the commissioners write that they are trying to 
avoid “que les recommendations ne soient qu’une succession de remèdes ponctuels visant 
chacun a contrer un probléme spècifique, sans justifications appropriée ni cohérence 
d’ensemble” [translation: “that the recommendations are nothing more than a series of 
targeted remedies seeking to deal with a specific problem, but without appropriate 




In any event, the Charbonneau Commission was proceeding more slowly than 
anticipated.  The committee wrapped up its hearings in the fall of 2014.  In late January 
2015, the commission requested another seven-month extention to its deadline.  The 
request was granted, pushing the new deadline out to November 2015.   
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Meanwhile, at the international level, anti-corruption efforts continue to unfold.  In 
January 2014, an initative was announced to develop a global data standard for public 
procurement.
269
  Recently, an international focus has been on banning “anonymous shell 




The most significant subsequent event took place on April 7, 2014: the PQ government 
was defeated in a general election.   It was a calamitous defeat for the PQ.  The Liberals 
were returned to power with a majority, winning 70 of the 125 seats in the National 
Assembly.  The PQ dropped to 30 seats.  Premier Pauline Marois even lost her own seat, 
and resigned as PQ leader very shortly afterwards.  Stéphane Bédard, the PQ’s point man 
on Bill 1, was re-elected in Chicoutimi.  He became interim leader of the PQ after Marois 
resigned. 
 
With the defeat of the PQ government, the anti-corruption “trilogy” about which Minister 
Bédard so often spoke was never enacted.  A related bill (Bill 61), designed to make it 
easier for the Quebec government to recover funds lost to procurement corruption, was 
introduced on November 13, 2013, but did not pass before the PQ government fell.  
Another bill (Bill 68), to establish a Quebec Transportation Agency to oversee the 
awarding and management of contracts in the transportation sector, was introduced on 
December 4, 2013, but proceeded no further, and died on the order paper when the 
National Assembly was dissolved for the election. 
 
The new Quebec government, led by Premier Phillippe Couillard, has indicated it will 
engage in some contracting reforms.
271
  It has not, however, indicated how it feels about 
the PQ’s anti-corruption project.  In particular, there has been no word on the Liberal 
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government’s stance towards the “trilogy” that had been repeatedly emphasized by 






CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this thesis has been to take seriously, as an object of legal study, the 
proceedings of an elected assembly as it develops anti-corruption legislation.  The 
spotlight has been thrown on one anti-corruption law in one province in one country, 
namely Bill 1, introduced in the Quebec National Assembly on November 1, 2012.   
 
The research question is not so much “Will this law work?” or “What should the law 
have said?”, because the answer to those questions, given the state of uncertainty in the 
anti-corruption literature, would inevitably be some version of “We don’t know” or “It’s 
too early to say.”  Rather, the research question is “Did Quebec’s lawmakers believe Bill 
1 would have an impact on corruption in public-sector procurement, and if so, what was 
the basis for that belief?” 
 
The minority status of the Quebec government in 2012, plus the availability of verbatim 
transcripts of all proceedings of the Quebec National Assembly and its committees, 
makes Bill 1 a promising case study for this kind of research.  The government had to be 
unusually transparent in its thought process and arguments, because it could not pass the 
bill without support from one or the other of the two main opposition parties. 
 
The purpose of this kind of research is to assist participants in the law-making process—
lawmakers, lobbyists, law reformers, and citizens—to understand better the process by 
which statute law is actually made.  
 
What we have seen is that Quebec’s lawmakers did hold a sincere belief that they were 
tackling corruption in public procurement.  We have also seen, however, that they had 
almost no objective evidence to support that belief.   
 
There was, at the time Bill 1 was moving through the Quebec National Assembly in 
November and December 2012, a substantial international and national context for 




CFPOA, and an array of anti-corruption initiatives, some supporting these instruments, 
some independent of them.  There was also a very extensive literature, both academic and 
non-academic, concerning the theory and practice of fighting corruption.  There was also 
a substantial amount of practical experience in jurisdictions, like the EU and New York 
City, that have put significant effort into fighting procurement corruption. 
 
In an ideal world, one would expect Quebec lawmakers to have borrowed from, and built 
on, the “state of the art” in anti-corruption efforts.  What we have in fact seen, in the 
journey of Bill 1 through the legislative process, is an almost total lack of connection 
between Bill 1 and the “state of the art.”  There is no reference, anywhere in the almost 
400,000 words of the transcripts, to the international or national anti-corruption 
instruments, or to the anti-corruption literature, or the practical experience of other 
jurisdictions.  That is the significant factual finding of this study. 
 
The centrepiece of Bill 1—referred to by its sponsoring minister as “the heart” of the 
law—is the pre-authorization for companies wishing to do business with the government.  
The sponsoring minister said this approach is “inspired by” legislation elsewhere, but 
nowhere in the transcripts does he state what other legislation inspired him.  My query to 
the Treasury Board office in Quebec City produced no result.  It is possible that the 
Quebec government was looking to New York City, which has a form of pre-
authorization, but we cannot say.  There is no reference in the transcripts to New York 
City, so any link to the public procurement system there is speculative. 
 
If Bill 1 was divorced from the international and national anti-corruption context, what 
was driving it?  Bill 1 appears to have been driven by two factors unrelated to any 
analysis of effective anti-corruption law-making. 
 
First, there was a consensus that corruption in public procurement was, and continued to 
be, a serious problem.  In the whole legislative process, there is not a single person who 
raises their voice in opposition to the passage of Bill 1.  All presenters before the 




to state their support for the principle of the bill.  Nobody questioned whether more 
legislation, in the form of Bill 1 or otherwise, was the best response or an effective 
response.  Quebec’s lawmakers were encouraged in the idea that a legislative response 
was appropriate. 
 
The second principal driver that influenced all aspects of the Bill 1 debate was speed—
the very plain desire on the part of the government to pass Bill 1 quickly. Bill 1 was put 
together quickly, in about six weeks, and the government wanted to pass it quickly, in 
another six weeks.  The government wanted to regain public confidence in public 
procurement, while underlining the contrast between it and the defeated Liberal 
government.  But those are political objectives, not policy objectives, and they are not 
directly related to whether the law would actually work to reduce corruption.  
 
Within the context of these two principal drivers, the emphasis in the debate is on 
building an edifice that sounds like it might work to stem corruption, rather than 
examining the evidence, in the literature and precedents from around the world, for what 
was likely to work.  Because there was so little information about the external context, the 
debate in the National Assembly and in the Standing Committee on Public Finance was 
focused mainly on the internal logic of the pre-authorization system created by Bill 1. 
 
Nobody can say with certainty that Bill 1 will not work.  The inherent difficulty in 
measuring corruption, and the difficulty of measuring the impact of anti-corruption laws, 
means that Bill 1’s impact cannot be proven or disproven.  And when a law’s impact 
cannot be proven or disproven, it is subject to partisan claims, such as the PQ 
government’s claim in late 2013 that its anti-corruption measures had saved taxpayers 
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All things considered, there has to be a serious doubt whether Bill 1 represents a 
sustainable anti-corruption agenda, to use the phrase introduced by EU Commissioner 
Malmstrom.
273
  As we saw in Chapter 3, other jurisdictions with a more advanced anti-
corruption agenda, such as the EU or New York City, recognize that legislation is too 
easy, and that the most effective response lies in enforcement, measurement, reporting, 
and correction.  In the absence of any reference to international standards and the anti-
corruption literature, it appears that Quebec has followed a path of unsustainability. 
 
A law that is not carefully designed can be counter-productive, and can actually make 
corruption worse.  To give just one example from the Charbonneau Commission, the City 
of Quebec had some work it wanted done in 2004.  It suspected collusion among 
engineering firms, so it divided the work into five pieces, and said no company could 
have more than one piece.  As an engineer testified, this actually eliminated competition, 
rather than increasing it.  This was the beginning of collusion among Quebec City 





It is conceivable, then, that Bill 1 could make things worse.  It could make things worse 
by drawing resources away from more effective anti-corruption measures.  It could make 
things worse by inefficiently eliminating competition, thus driving up prices.  It could 
make things worse by bolstering an illusion that corruption is under control, when it is 
not.    
 
Even if Bill 1 does not make things actually worse, it could still have negative effects.   
Considerable administrative effort will likely be expended by the UPAC and the AMF.  
There likely will be complaints about processing delays.  There likely will be reports 
about individuals or companies with dubious pasts who nevertheless receive their pre-
authorization.  There likely will be reports about individuals or companies with clean 
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pasts whose business is ruined by a mysterious failure to obtain their pre-authorization.  
A compliance industry of lawyers, accountants, and compliance professionals will likely 
spring up.  There may be fewer prominent cases of corruption in public-sector 
procurement, in which case Bill 1 will be declared a success, but it may be only because 
corruption has moved to other industries, or because corruption finds ways to hide in a 
web of hidden ownership structures.  It is likely that no future government will repeal Bill 
1, for fear of being criticized for laxity, unless it is replaced by a different anti-corruption 
regime. 
 
The possible futility of legislation, and perhaps even its counter-productiveness, is not a 
new phenomenon.  Here, for example, is historian Doris Kearns Goodwin writing about 
the impetus for the Interstate Commerce Act in the US: 
 
Responding to the public outcry that followed the Wabash decision, 
Congress filled the regulatory void in 1887 by passing the Interstate 
Commerce Act, which created an Interstatee Commerce Commission 
(ICC) to ensure that railroad rates were “reasonable and just.”  The 
practice of granting rebates to favored big shippers, which essentially 
destroyed smaller competitors, was outlawed.  But the legislation did not 
authorize the commission to set specific rates, a fatal omission that 
allowed railroad barons to challenge the ICC rulings in the courts at 
every turn, thereby rendering the law largely ineffective.  In time, 
railroad executives actually found the law useful.  “It satisfies the public 
clamor for a government supervision of railroads,” one corporate 
lawyer, Richard Olney, wrote, “at the same time that the supervision is 





In the same manner, it is worth asking whether Bill 1 met “the public clamor” in Quebec 
to clamp down on procurement corruption, while having an almost entirely nominal 
effect. 
 
That could be the end of the inquiry there, but there is yet another set of questions raised 
by the analysis in this thesis.   
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When I began this study, I did not expect to find that Quebec’s lawmakers would so 
comprehensively have ignored the legal context in which they were working.  They did 
not refer even once to existing international or national anti-corruption instruments, apart 
from incorporating various provisions of the Criminal Code into the list of infractions for 
which pre-authorization could be denied; they did not refer even once to the vast anti-
corruption literature; they did not refer even once to practical anti-corruption experience 
from the OECD, the EU, or New York City.  Instead, Quebec’s lawmakers appear to 
have been driven by two political imperatives: the desire to show the public that 
something was being done; and the desire to act quickly. 
 
Perhaps I should not have been surprised, since it accords broadly with my experience as 
a lawmaker in Nova Scotia’s House of Assembly.  Lawmakers do not typically have the 
time, the interest, or the resources to delve into the context of a law which is before them.  
Since the way they will vote has been determined before debate begins, there is not much 
political gain to be had in spending time on research.  The lawmaking process has a 
context and an impetus all of its own.  Public perception and timing are important 
elements of that context. 
 
If we accept that Bill 1’s passage into law was driven by factors other than objective 
evidence that it would work to stem corruption, there are important implications for those 
who wish to influence the legislative process.  In a law-making context driven as much or 
more by politics (e.g. public perception, speed) than legal knowledge (e.g. instruments, 
literature, precedent), what is the role of the expert?  What is the role of the law 
reformer?  What is the role of the legal scholar? 
 
The analysis in this thesis suggests that much advocacy and law reform effort can be 
wasted if the advocates and reformers do not understand the legislative dynamic.  To 
illustrate the point, suppose a world-renowned anti-corruption academic had appeared 
before the Standing Committee on Public Finance, to lay out the international and 




out the lessons from the literature, and to offer lessons from practical experience in 
jurisdictions like the EU and New York City.  Would it have made any difference?  
Probably not, because the driving forces behind Bill 1 were political (i.e. do something, 
and do it quickly) and not substantive (i.e. how can we ensure this particular anti-
corruption law is as effective as possible?). 
 
By the time Bill 1 got to the Standing Committee, it was a done deal in principle, though 
perhaps not in every detail.  The new government had led its legislative agenda with Bill 
1.  Backing down, or even slowing down, could have been contrary to non-policy factors 
that were driving the PQ government forward.   
 
To be effective, an expert would have had to get involved right from the start, from the 
first day that Stephane Bédard sat down with Julie Blackburn after the 2012 election and 
started talking about an anti-corruption bill.  Perhaps something like that did happen; but 
if so, there is no hint of it in the transcripts.  Despite the façade that law-making was 
happening in the open, in the National Assembly, the truth is that the essentials of Bill 1 
were written behind the scenes, in rooms where an independent observer could not go. 
 
The National Assembly’s lawmakers may have been sincere in their expressed desire to 
fight corruption, but the political context was such that they were limited in their 
knowledge, their resources, and their willingness to find the most effective legislative 
response to corruption in Quebec’s public-sector procurement. 
 
And now the government that sponsored Bill 1 has been defeated, and Quebec’s 
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